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Abstract 
A participatory scenario building process for small island resilience is carried out for the 
Tenerife Island (Canary Islands, Spain). The plot of the scenarios is based on institutional 
analyses and participatory techniques where key local stakeholders and citizens were 
engaged. A press analysis was done in order to identify the main narratives regarding the 
current level of resilience and its potentialities in the future, as well as to identify the 
stakeholders involved in the discourse. Meanwhile, in-depth interviews, questionnaires and 
focus groups were carried out to engage the stakeholders and local citizens in the 
exploration of future scenarios for resilience in Tenerife. The scenarios brought out three 
potential pathways for 2040. The first scenario prolongs the current business-as-usual 
situation where the island may be defined as highly vulnerable to external shocks, 
especially due to its high external dependency on food and energy production, as well as 
the need for energy allocated to water desalination. The second scenario relies on an active 
local community that encourages increasing rates of local food production and a 100 % 
renewable energy system such that desalination may no longer depend on fossil fuels. 
Lastly, the third scenario depicts a pathway where several active groups of people engage 
in building resilience without the umbrella of local governments, due to politicians who are 
no longer seen as part of the solution, but part of the problem. Now, collaborative 
community networks in bio-agriculture, fog-water collection, and cooperative-based 
renewable energy production become increasingly important. Findings show that resilience 
is understood as the reinforcement of the nexus between water-energy-food sovereignty 
that might imply a change in the local economic model such that poverty can be reduced 
and climatic shocks can be buffered. 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to explore future scenarios of resilience for a small European 
island (Tenerife, Canary Islands). Three scenarios are explored for 2040, which work as an 
excuse for the researchers to approach the concept of resilience as well as its meaning for 
small-island contexts. This report is the continuation of previous works developed by the 
Joint Research Centre regarding adaptation to climate change. Thus, Hernández-González 
et al. (2016) explored policies and measures that could be undertaken in Tenerife to 
increase the adaptation capacity against heatwaves and Saharan dust outbreaks. In-depth 
interviews, questionnaires and focus groups were conducted to key local stakeholders and 
experts in climate change so that problems and actions could be identified and explored 
in-depth. The conclusions obtained in Hernández-González et al. (2016) highlighted the 
lack of institutions in charge of climate policy and uncertainties in climate modelling as the 
main concerns. These conclusions were however confronted with local citizens’ perceptions 
by means of three focus group sessions carried out across the Tenerife Island (Hernandez 
et al., 2017). Local citizens did not perceive the lack of climate policy as the main 
problematique of the island, but the lack of policy measures oriented to increase the 
resilience of the island against potential external shocks, no matter if they might involve 
economic shocks, energy shortage or climatic risks. Meanwhile, the lack of adaptation was 
conceived as one more issue to be dealt with among others, such as food, energy, and 
water external dependency, which also need attention within the local resilience discourse. 
This is the scope of this investigation: to explore how those ‘other’ issues may evolve and 
interact in the future. Even though resilience is multidimensional, as shown in the report, 
special attention will be given to the nexus energy-water-food produced locally, as well as 
the link between economic models and poverty. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 What are scenarios? 
Scenarios consist of describing stories about the future with a logical plot and narrative 
(Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000; Raskin et al., 2002). «Scenarios can serve as self-fulfilling 
attractors, desirable visions of the future that help galvanize effective actions for their 
realization» (Raskin et al., 1998, p. 4). Scenarios elucidate alternative world visions and 
values, and encourage deliberation (Gallopín et al., 1997). Their goal is to provide informed 
and coherent action by means of insight into the scope of the possible (Raskin et al., 2002). 
Scenarios may be thought of as comprehensive and possible stories expressed in words 
and figures, about possible co-evolutionary pathways of combined human and 
environmental systems (Swart et al., 2004). Well-articulated scenarios will certainly 
include quantitative insight from scientific models in order to provide discipline and rigor 
(Gallopín et al., 1997). Scenarios can provide a broader perspective than model-based 
analyses, by means of qualitative scenario narratives that also give a voice to important 
non-quantifiable aspects such as values, behaviours and institutions (Raskin et al., 2002). 
Thus, narrative scenarios offer texture, richness and insight, while quantitative analysis 
provides structure, discipline and rigour (Swart et al., 2004). 
Scenarios can either be descriptive, which plot possible developments starting from what 
we know about current conditions and trends, or normative, constructed to lead to a future 
based on subjective values given by the authors (Swart et al., 2004). Normative scenarios 
represent organised attempts to evaluate the feasibility and consequences of trying to 
achieve certain desired outcomes or avoid the risks of undesirable ones, whereas 
descriptive scenario analysis, tries to articulate different plausible future societal 
developments, and explore their consequences (Swart et al., 2004). The choice between 
descriptive or normative scenarios depends on the objectives of the scenario development 
exercise (Swart et al., 2004). 
Scenarios generally include: (a) a definition of problem boundaries; (b) a characterisation 
of current conditions and driving forces; (c) an identification of critical uncertainties and 
assumptions on how they might be resolved; and (d) images of the future (Swart et al., 
2004). The scenarios should: (a) have regional disaggregation, (b) be comprehensive (with 
an integrated treatment of major environmental, social and economic issues and 
interactions), (c) be analytically sound (use of data and scientific theory), and should also 
be diverse (representation of a range of future visions, values, and world views) (Gallopín 
et al., 1997). 
Scenario building should be intensively participatory, or else it fails (Raskin et al., 1998; 
Schwartz, 1991). Scenarios should evolve from different rounds of discussions, feedbacks 
and subsequent improvements. There should also be interaction between the scenario 
developers, modellers, reviewers and the groups working on visions for sectors and regions 
(Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000). The development and discussion of qualitative scenarios 
work as a platform for consultation among many stakeholders from different disciplinary 
backgrounds and perspectives (Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000). The scenario approach 
can also deliver a shared agenda for varied stakeholders to map and address the critical 
concerns and, therefore, detect alternatives as well as a scene for discussion and debate 
(Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000).Here, in this report, the authors define scenarios as a 
puzzle composed of existing and dispersed information regarding a certain issue (in this 
case resilience) that needs to be brought together in a single piece in order to explore 
which pathways a community may walk through in the future of that specific issue. 
2.2 Some applications 
Schwartz (1991) defined three global scenarios based on the possibility of having 
war/peace, prosperity/depression, and an atmosphere of freedom/restraint. The first 
scenario he planned was ‘New empires’. It consisted of regional alliances that protect each 
other, meanwhile those outside the alliance are economic rivals. There is a strong fight for 
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the control of natural resources. Arm trade is booming and each block possesses nuclear 
weapons. As a consequence, the world enters in one of the most tragic wars of history. 
The second scenario was ‘Market world’, which consisted of an entrepreneurial, 
multicultural world and full of hope and harshness. It is a capitalistic open market, although 
there are top countries and those left behind. A ‘sustainable growth’ becomes the rule and 
even though there are increasing communities at the bottom of the social scale, they have 
the possibility of climbing out of poverty. His last scenario is called ‘Change without 
progress’. He defines it as a future of chaos and crisis, in which people see themselves as 
fighting the system, and the system falls apart. It is a scenario with fast-paced economic 
activity, but also corruption, high inflation, high unemployment, overvalued currencies, 
high interest rates, social conflict, poverty and environmental decay. 
Gallopín et al. (1997) begin with three broad classes of scenarios which they call 
‘Conventional Worlds’, ‘Barbarization’, and ‘Great Transitions’. For each class, they define 
two variants though, for a total of 6 scenarios: (1) Conventional worlds reference scenario; 
(2) Conventional worlds policy reform; (3) Barbarization breakdown; (4) Barbarization 
fortress world; (5) Great transitions to eco-communalism; and (6) Great transitions to new 
sustainability paradigm. Within the Conventional worlds, the reference variant incorporates 
competitive markets, rapid economic growth, social and environmental stress, and the 
convergence of global regions. The policy reform scenario achieves greater social equity 
and environmental protection by means of rapidly diffusing environmental-friendly 
technology. Barbarization breakdown leads to conflict, institutional disintegration, and 
economic collapse. The Fortress world features an authoritarian response to the threat of 
breakdown. Great transitions explore visionary solutions to the sustainability challenge, 
including new socioeconomic arrangements and fundamental changes in values. These 
scenarios depict a transition to a society that preserves natural systems, provides high 
levels of welfare through material sufficiency and equitable distribution, and enjoys a 
strong sense of social solidarity. Raskin et al., 1998 defines in their Bending the curve the 
possibilities for sustainable development by pushing for important changes within an 
evolutionary ‘Conventional worlds’ context developed by Gallopín et al. (1997). The first 
scenario is based on larger urban populations and global economic growth. The values of 
materialism and individualism are the worldwide rules. Significant income disparity 
between rich and poor countries and between the rich and poor within countries remain. 
Pollution is an issue as a consequence of rapid economic growth. According to the authors, 
this scenario is environmental and socially unsustainable. That is why they define the other 
scenario called ‘Policy reform’, where poverty reduction goals are achieved through 
initiatives to increase the incomes of the poor. Greater international equity between rich 
and poor countries and greater national equity within countries are also considered. 
Energy, water and resource use efficiency increase substantially. Renewable energy, 
ecologically based agricultural practices, and integrated eco-efficient industrial systems 
become the norm. 
Gallopín and Rijsberman (2000) focused on the development of qualitative scenarios for 
future global water management. They defined three scenarios: (1) ‘Business as usual’; 
(2) ‘Economics, technology and private sector’; and (3) ‘Values and lifestyles’. The first 
scenario refers to a future trajectory where no major policy or lifestyle change takes place. 
The second scenario is a result of policies that rely on the market, the involvement of the 
private sector and technological solutions. Lastly, the third scenario is the one that could 
materialise through human values, strengthened international cooperation, heavy 
emphasis on education, international mechanisms and rules, increased solidarity and 
changes in lifestyles and behaviour. 
Raskin et al. (2002) explored the scenarios of ‘Great transitions’ developed by Gallopín et 
al. (1997). They developed four scenarios: ‘Market forces’, ‘Policy reform’, ‘Fortress world’ 
and ‘Great transitions’. ‘Market forces’ is a world of accelerating economic globalisation and 
minimal environmental and social protection. Technological innovation reduces the 
environmental impact per unit of human activity, but the increase in the scale of those 
activities triggers larger impacts. Economies in poor regions grow rapidly, but with social 
disparities. The result is a continued erosion of environmental health and the persistence 
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of poverty. ‘Policy reform’ features government initiatives to constrain the economy in 
order to attain a broad set of social and environmental goals. Sustainability policy shapes 
the planetary transition. Rapid deployment of alternative technology, such as eco-efficient 
industrial and agricultural practices, highly resource efficient equipment and renewable 
resources. It also targets programs to reduce poverty. ‘Fortress world’ envisions a period 
of crisis leading to an authoritarian and inequitable future. Tyranny shapes the global 
transition. In ‘Great transition’, a connected and engaged global citizenry advances a new 
development paradigm that emphasises the quality of life, human solidarity, and a strong 
ecological sensibility. New values shape the planetary transition, such as rapid penetration 
of environmentally technologies, a shift toward less material-intensive lifestyles, 
consumerism abates, populations stabilise, growth slows in affluent areas, and settlement 
patterns become more integrated and compact. 
Özkaynak (2008) explored four local scenarios for the city of Yalova (Turkey), regarding 
economic, social, and environmental issues. The author presents a first scenario ‘Yalova 
within free markets’ in which Turkey is engaged in Europe under a deregulation and 
privatisation environment, with reduced social and environmental protection. The second 
scenario is called ‘Yalova within social Europe’, in which the European Union is concerned 
about social and environmental protection. The third scenario unfolds the ‘Business as 
usual in Yalova’ in which the European Union cannot accept Turkey’s membership. And a 
last scenario ‘Inward-looking Yalova’ in which the European Union does not accept Turkey’s 
membership but accepts a special treatment. 
Resilience has also been subject to scenario building. Thus, Gerst et al. (2014) proposed 
three scenarios for global resilience: (1) ‘Conventional development’; (2) ‘Policy reform’; 
and (3) ‘Great transition’. The first one represents mid-range population growth, 
urbanisation, economic growth and technological change. A lack of coordinated action on 
environmental issues remains the norm. The trends would lead to a massive increase in 
stress on important Earth system processes. The second scenario pretends to achieve 
sustainability goals. A comprehensive set of internationally-binding initiatives are 
implemented, such as global sustainable development goals, together with widely-held 
social targets, strong policy instruments (such as eco-taxes, market mechanisms, 
regulation, social programs, and technology development). The last scenario is a structural 
shift to a new development paradigm, based on a re-assessment of lifestyle, values, and 
human well-being towards material sufficiency for all, leisure time, family, and community. 
Campos et al. (2016) described climate change adaptation planning for protecting a 
vulnerable coastal system. Scenario workshops and adaptation pathways in the context of 
a participatory action were designed. A Scenario A referred to ‘do nothing’ and maintain 
existing coastal defence structures, resulting in serious flooding events and damage to 
human settlements and infrastructures with great economic losses. Scenario B protects 
with massive investments through a series of constructions (dykes and breakwaters), 
which changes the natural landscape, as well as economic and social life in the region. 
Scenario C relocates some local settlements, gaining ecological value by means of sea 
advance and coastal erosion to continue at will. 
Corral-Quintana et al. (2016) proposed two scenarios for desertification in the Canary 
Islands. One is called ‘Desert’ and the other ‘Oasis’. Both were aimed at demonstrating 
different ideas about the Canary Islands within the next 30 years with regards to the 
desertification process. The ‘Desert’ scenario pretends to narrate a business as usual 
evolution of the Canary Islands. This scenario reflects the results of an expansion of desert 
areas, a deficient living conditions and a decrease in the gross domestic product (GDP). 
However, climate change and economic recovery impose large uncertainties. Whereas the 
‘Oasis’ represents a positive image of the future that would lead to a reduction of desert 
areas, an improvement of living conditions, and GDP increases. Climate change and 
economic recovery impose large uncertainties as well. 
To our knowledge, there is only one work plotting scenarios for small islands that flirt with 
the concept of resilience, although they are more focused on sustainability paths 
(Kaltenborn et al., 2012). Some definitions of resilience for small islands are given in Box 
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1. Kaltenborn et al. (2012) explored four scenarios for the future (2025) of the Vega island 
(Norway), engaing stakeholders and citizens by means of workshop and survey techniques. 
The participatory process applied engaged the actors from the beginning of the process 
until its end, i.e. the local communities not only participated in the elaboration of the 
scenarios, but also could reflect on the scenario results. Even though the scenarios reflected 
the potentiality of tourism as an economic activity, the islanders showed little faith in the 
tourism sector and prefer to rely on its traditional sectors such as agriculture and fisheries. 
In Table 1, a summary of the examples presented above is given. Three are usually the 
number of scenarios explored, whereas six are usually the number of driving forces 
considered. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the examples reviewed 
Number of 
scenarios 
Number of driving 
forces Representation Source 
3 — Narratives Campos et al., 2016 
2 5 Narratives, data and 
scenario unfolds 
Corral-Quintana et 
al., 2016 
6 7 Narratives, data and 
scenario unfolds 
Gallopín et al., 
1997 
3 6 Narratives, data and 
scenario unfolds 
Gallopín and 
Rijsberman, 2000 
3 3 Narratives and data Gerst et al., 2014 
3 8 Narratives Kaltenborn et al., 
2012 
4 14 Narratives Özkaynak, 2008 
2 6 Narratives and data Raskin et al., 1998 
4 6 Narratives and data Raskin et al., 2002 
3 7 Narratives Schwartz, 1991 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Box 1. Some definitions of resilience for small islands 
— «[It] is the capacity to create stable equilibria between the elements that interact within 
a landscape and the capacity to survive and avoid negative effects in the face of 
hazards. As a consequence, sustainability should be interpreted not only as a future 
scenario but as a way of building resilience. Thus, the linkage between and 
interdependence of the two terms appears very strong» (Bonati, 2014, p. 519). 
— «[It] refers to the ability of the overall system to absorb unspecified disturbances, even 
those that are novel, unforeseen, or infrequent»’ (Lauer et al., 2013, p. 49). 
— «[It might be understood as] flexibility, as adaptation interventions shift from 
attempting to respond to particular stresses or hazards to building systems that are 
adaptable in the face of any kind of disturbance» (Popke et al., 2016, p. 74). 
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3 Material and methods 
The methodology used in this case study, intended to unfold scenarios for resilience in 
Tenerife, is presented in Table 2. The methodology is composed of both a backbone 
approach and development methods. 
 
Table 2. Methodologies to unfold the scenarios 
Backbone Development methods 
 Characterisation of current state 
o What is the problem? 
1. Institutional analysis 
o Literature review 
o Press review 
o Questionnaires 
o In-depth 
interviews 
o Focus groups with 
stakeholders and 
citizens 
 
2. Power-relation 
analysis 
o Literature review 
o Press review 
o Focus groups 
 
 Identify critical dimensions 
o What are the attributes of the future images? 
 Identify driving forces 
o What are the key factors influencing the situations? 
 Identify strategic invariants 
o What are the invariant driving forces that remain the 
same for all scenarios? 
 Identify critical uncertainties 
o What are the driving forces that entail an uncertain 
evolution? 
 Unfold the images of the future 
o What are the scenarios to be unfolded? 
Source: the backbone methodology is based on Gallopín et al., 1997 and Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000. The 
development methods are based on Corral Quintana, 2004; De Marchi et al., 2000; Guimarães Pereira and Corral 
Quintana, 2002; Hernández González and Corral Quintana, 2016; Gamboa and Munda, 2007; Paneque Salgado 
et al., 2009. 
 
In the next section both techniques will be presented. 
3.1 Development methods 
3.1.1 Institutional analysis and participatory techniques 
Institutional analysis (IA) should be considered as a fact-finding procedure to examine 
different structures and social relationships (Corral Quintana, 2004). Theoretical aspects 
of IA either to justify the necessity of these approaches (Ostrom, 1990, 2005) or suggest 
guidelines (Ingram et al., 1984) or frameworks of analysis (Imperial, 1999; Koontz, 2006) 
have been discussed. IA provides a more precise approximation to the prevailing social and 
institutional arrangements, assumed as a social context shaped by institutions that delimit 
citizens’ rights and responsibilities (Bromley, 1989; Commons, 1961; Schmid, 1972). 
Meanwhile, economic powerholders can also have an influence over institutions and 
decision-making (Abad, 2016). 
Institutional arrangements have been considered important for the understanding of 
climate change adaptation strategies. Thus, severity of heatwaves, in terms of either 
intensity or frequency, shape institutional arrangements among interest parts (Eisenack, 
2016). Other studies have detected that even though the synergies between mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change are underpinned in legislation, the interpretation of that 
pieces of legislation does not consider these synergies, leading to isolated analyses and 
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missed opportunities (Larsen et al., 2012). It has also been said that small islands tend to 
be more resilient as a consequence of dense social networks, such as collective action, 
reciprocity, and relations of trust, being all this particularly relevant for climate change 
adaptation (Petzold and Ratter, 2015). Other studies detected lack of coordination among 
institutions leading to a reduced adaptation capacity (Storbjörk and Hedrén, 2011). 
Institutional constraints are also relevant to understand the associated complexities of 
climate change adaptation. An analysis conducted in the Netherlands for agriculture 
adaptation, concluded that the heterogeneity of actors’ interests on the one hand, and the 
availability of resources on the other, were two relevant obstacles to implement adaptation 
measures (Mandryk et al., 2015). In effect, local power structures shape adaptation 
decision-making. Næss et al. (2005) detected that when powerful stakeholders coincide in 
the necessity of adapting to climate change, adaptation measures are quickly implemented. 
Furthermore, Næss et al. also argue that local institutional relations and power structures 
act like filters of new currents in adaptation so as to slow down the process of community 
learning. 
IA is generally carried out through the employment of diverse social methods and 
participatory approaches. Thus, in the present research, a historical review of the local and 
regional press articles and legislation, together with an in-depth round of interviews 
allowed framing the social and political context in which climate change adaptation in 
Tenerife is embedded. In this sense, IA enables an evolutionary analysis of the role and 
standpoints of each stakeholder and citizens, providing a map of the relevant stakeholders 
and their positions. Thus, the information that could be collected through IA is presented 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Potential information that could be collected from experts and stakeholders 
Framing A definition of the problematique at hand. 
Existing climate change policies. 
Stakeholders’ objectives and strategies (e.g. hidden agenda). 
Uncertainties. 
Proposal of 
stakeholders 
Each stakeholder recommends the inclusion of other key social 
actors. 
Preliminary proposal 
of policy packages 
Potential policy options for adaptation. 
Obstacles to the implementation of those policy options. 
Preliminary proposal 
of evaluation criteria 
Indicators to evaluate policy packages. 
Source: own elaboration based on questionnaires and in-depth interviews. 
 
Therefore, IA has been used to develop the framing phase of the scenario building, as 
indicated in Table 3. The next sections will be devoted to provide more insight on the 
concrete methods carried out during the IA process. 
3.1.1.1 Press review 
It consists of the review of the local press that make reference to the case study. According 
to Corral Quintana (2004), press review is a valuable source of information since it allows 
for a wider an objective view of the issue at hand; wider because different opinions are 
seen; and objective because it helps the analysts to approach the issue from different 
perspectives. This social technique has been successfully applied to different environmental 
assessment case studies, such as air quality (Corral Quintana, 2004), water resources 
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management (De Marchi et al., 2000; Paneque Salgado et al., 2009), and sustainable 
mobility (Hernández González and Corral Quintana, 2016). 
For the purpose of this case study, local press analysis has allowed the analysts for the 
possibility to access the next sources of information: 
— Framing. It could be seen that heatwaves and Saharan dust events are a frequent 
climatic phenomena in the Canary Islands. Moreover, local experts in climate change 
were identified, and indicated that there are relevant policy gaps and a lack of multi-
risk policy foresight in the island. Air pollution is not so deeply covered by the media, 
even though there are severe problems related to this (see Hernández-González et al., 
2016). However, some media press articles have reported increasing mortality and 
overuse of medical services, as a consequence of increasing Morbidity.  
— Identification of experts and relevant stakeholders. A certain number of local 
experts in climate change and relevant stakeholders could be detected, allowing for 
contacts to be considered for in-depth interviews. 
3.1.1.2 In-depth interviews to experts and stakeholders 
In-depth interviews to experts and stakeholders have been considered appropriate to 
implement IA (De Marchi et al., 2000; Paneque Salgado et al., 2009). Initially, experts are 
interviewed first (Corral Quintana, 2004) in order to have a preliminary list of stakeholders 
to be engaged and contacted (Hernández González, 2014). Thus, experts are then ‘used’ 
as ‘keys that open certain doors that otherwise cannot be opened’. Then, once all relevant 
stakeholders were identified, they were contacted by phone. 
By means of open questions, relevant information is collected, such as policy gaps and new 
alternative policy options (Corral Quintana, 2004; Guimarães Pereira et al., 2003; Paneque 
Salgado et al., 2009). In the present case study, in-depth interviews have been used to; 
(1) frame the issue; (2) collect existing reports and scientific publications on the subject; 
(3) propose resilience policy strategies; and (4) map the positions of the stakeholders 
regarding the issue under analysis. 
A part from the in-depth interviews, a questionnaire was also conducted in order to collect 
more precise information, as well as to analyse the consistency of the answers given in the 
in-depth interviews. 
3.1.1.3 Focus groups 
Morgan (1996, p. 130) defines focus groups «as a research technique that collects data 
through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher». It has also been 
defined as a social event (Bloor et al., 2001) or a form of group interviewing (Gibbs, 1997) 
that pursues the collection of qualitative information intended to answer research questions 
(Morgan and Krueger, 1993). It helps the researchers to detect attitudes, feelings, beliefs, 
experiences, and reactions that would not be collected by other social research method 
(Gibbs, 1997; Kitzinger, 1994). 
Focus groups have been considered useful tools to learn more about the degree of 
consensus of a certain topic, as well as the opinion of the stakeholders involved, and their 
reasons to answer certain research questions (Morgan and Krueger, 1993). Focus groups 
are also useful to collect information on tensions between opposing parties (Kitzinger, 
1994; Morgan and Krueger, 1993). Similarly, focus groups might be appropriate to shed 
light on uncertainties and ambiguities related to the issue at hand (Bloor et al., 2001), 
being an effective and economical way to collect relevant information in a short period of 
time (Gibbs, 1997). 
For all these reasons, focus groups have become attractive techniques for citizen 
participation, since they are flexible tools that can be used at any step of a decision-making 
process (Bloor et al., 2001); flexible because groups can be sorted, for example, by age 
(Guimarães and Funtowicz, 2013). Just to mention some examples, focus groups has been 
applied to improve governance of water resources (Guimarães Pereira et al., 2005; 
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Paneque Salgado et al., 2009), to assess windfarm location (Gamboa and Munda, 2007) 
and sustainable mobility policies (Hernández González and Corral Quintana, 2016). 
However, it has to be noted that focus groups are not representative of what the 
community think about a certain issue (Gamboa and Munda, 2007); it is rather a social 
research method (Bloor et al., 2001; Morgan and Krueger, 1993). 
In the current analysis, four focus group sessions were carried out. The first one was 
developed along with experts in resilience and social actors in order to: (1) frame the issue 
at hand, i.e. is climate change perceived as a risk in Tenerife? Is there a lack of climate 
change adaptation policies in the island? and (2) if so, what can be done to increase the 
island resilience? (see Hernández-González et al., 2016). The second series of focus groups 
consisted of three sessions with local citizens, aimed at: (1) framing and understanding 
local climate change perceptions; (2) exploring future images of Tenerife in 2040; and (3) 
exploring specific actions that might be implemented to increase resilience in Tenerife (see 
Hernandez et al., 2017). 
3.1.2 Power-relation analysis 
Corral Quintana (2004) defines power relations as the combination of different available 
resources to be used by certain stakeholders as well as their ability to use them well. These 
resources are related to legal, political, economic, administrative, knowledge and 
information assets. Thus, the more resources available (and properly used), the more level 
of power a stakeholder might have. 
Furthermore, Corral Quintana (2004) also suggests that the level of power can also be 
stronger if powerholders form coalitions, as shown elsewhere (Abad, 2016). Coalitions can 
be forecasted as well as its intensity by means of a dendrogram, as presented by Munda 
(1994); see Figure 1. Therefore, the more powerful the coalition is, the more capabilities 
they have to shape decision-making in their favour. 
Figure 1. Example of dendrogram of coalitions 
 
Source: JRC, 1996. 
Power relations will be considered as a relevant driving force in the proposal of scenarios 
for resilience. The next section is devoted to present the backbone approach. 
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3.2 Backbone approach 
3.2.1 Characterisation of current state 
The current state helps to represent the conditions of the socio-ecological system as well 
as other major factors propelling the system forward (Gallopín et al., 1997). It has been 
defined as ‘the historical context, key characteristics of the study areas, events, main 
issues of concern and actors’ (Özkaynak, 2008, p. 55). Therefore, a definition of the 
problem at hand and its main characteristics is needed. 
The IA carried out is a key element to detect what the current state is (although it will be 
further analysed in the ‘Business as usual’ scenario, unfold in the next section). Tenerife is 
seen as a low resilient island, due to its vulnerability to external shocks, including climatic, 
economic and energy ones (Hernandez et al., 2017). The island is highly dependent on 
external fossil fuel energy sources, since nearly 98 % of primary energy consumption 
comes from oil imported by ship, as well as food production. Furthermore, water supply 
requires desalination techniques by means of fossil fuels such that water demand can be 
satisfied. Meanwhile, local governance is not committed towards resilience. 
3.2.2 Critical dimensions 
Critical dimensions are the multi-dimensional space from which the scenarios can be built 
and unfold (Corral-Quintana et al., 2016; Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000). Critical 
dimensions are, therefore, the important attributes of the scenarios (Gallopín and 
Rijsberman, 2000). Critical dimensions may be demography, science, technology, 
economy, society, education and culture, governance, social values, and the environment 
and natural resources (Corral-Quintana et al., 2016; Speth, 1992). However, following the 
IA carried out in the case study (Hernández-González et al., 2016; Hernandez et al., 2017), 
the critical dimensions considered in this case study are the following: 
 
— demography 
— economy 
— society 
— governance 
— technology 
— environment. 
 
Once the critical dimensions are presented, each dimension may be composed of different 
driving forces. These are presented below. 
3.2.3 Driving forces and strategic invariants 
Driving forces (or drivers of change) have been defined as the «persistent and dominant 
phenomena and processes already in the pipeline» (Gallopín et al., 1997, p. 8). They could 
also be seen as «key factors, trends or processes which influence the situation, focal issue, 
or decisions, and actually propel the system forward and determine the story’s outcome» 
(Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000, p. 3). It has also been said to be the «point of departure 
for all scenarios» or a set of «trends that currently condition and change the system» 
(Raskin et al., 2002, p. 19). Driving forces have also been called ‘initiative forces’ (Corral-
Quintana et al., 2016, p. 95) defined as «factors, tendencies or key process, which may 
influence the situation or decisions made, as well as those that drive the system and co-
determine the unfolding of the future scenario». 
Examples of driving forces can be population growth, economic growth, trade, technological 
change, lifestyles, culture, poverty, inequality, decentralisation of authority, power 
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structure, level of conflict, resource depletion, pollution and environmental change 
(Gallopín et al., 1997; Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000; Raskin et al., 2002). 
These driving forces can be split up into two different kind of drivers: (1) initial drivers; 
and (2) drivers subject to change (Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000; Raskin et al., 2002). 
The former are drivers that remain the same to all scenarios (population growth and 
technological change for example). Gallopín and Rijsberman (2000) call these drivers 
‘strategic invariants’, whereas Corral-Quintana et al. (2016) use the term ‘pre-determined 
elements’. The second kind of driver, however, refers to drivers that may change when a 
scenario is unfolding (economic output, environmental quality, etc.). 
Furthermore, driving forces can either be external or local, or both, as well as can be global, 
regional, national or local (Özkaynak, 2008). To the ends of this case study, and following 
the IA carried out in Hernández-González et al., (2016) and Hernandez et al., (2017), the 
following driving forces and strategic invariants (the latter in italics) will be used: 
 
— Demography: 
● population growth 
● ageing population 
— Economy: 
● recovery/recession 
● employment/computerisation 
● food sovereignty 
● tourism sector sustainability 
— Society: 
● poverty and inequality 
● social values and lifestyle 
— Governance: 
● power relations 
● politics and decision-making 
— Energy and technology: 
● energy and green technologies 
— Environment: 
● heatwaves 
● Saharan dust events 
● land-based transport planning 
● air quality 
● water governance 
 
Driving forces may imply acknowledging deep uncertainties in their future development. 
In this case, we refer to critical uncertainties. 
3.2.4 Critical uncertainties 
Critical uncertainties may represent some driving forces that will fundamentally alter the 
course of events (Gallopín et al., 1997). They represent «important factors or processes 
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that 1) have an important role in determining the unfolding of the scenarios in terms of 
the dynamics of the issue at hand, and 2) have values or outcomes which are very difficult 
to anticipate today. In other words, they refer to trends or events which could make major 
difference in the likelihood of the materialization of one or other scenario, and which are 
currently very difficult to anticipate» (Gallopín and Rijsberman, 2000, p. 4). Critical 
uncertainties have also been defined as «those initiatives forces whose progression cannot 
be anticipated, but are fundamentally known to affect a set of events, determining principal 
differences between scenarios» (Corral-Quintana et al., 2016, p. 96). Examples of critical 
uncertainties could be major political decisions, or environmental and social tensions 
(Özkaynak, 2008). 
In the case study under analysis, the next critical uncertainties have been identified: 
 
— social values and lifestyle: it cannot be foreseen if the local society of Tenerife will react 
to the ‘business as usual’ scenario and would be willing to change to more resilient 
lifestyles and change to a more politically proactive society; 
— tourism sector sustainability: it cannot be foreseen if, for example, a revolutionary 
technology could be able to transport passengers from abroad to Tenerife by means of 
planes powered by renewable energies; 
— recovery/recession: it cannot be foreseen if the current economic recovery will continue 
or not; 
— Saharan dust events: even though this extreme weather event has become more 
intense and frequent in the last decades, its future evolution is unknown or poorly 
understood. 
 
In Table 4, a summary of the backbone structure to develop the scenarios for resilience 
in Tenerife is presented.  
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Table 4. Backbone structure to unfold the scenarios 
Critical 
dimensions 
Driving forces Strategic 
invariants 
Critical 
uncertainties 
Demography 
Population growth    
Ageing population    
Economy 
Recovery/recession     
Employment/computerisation    
Food sovereignty  
 
Tourism sector sustainability    
Society 
Poverty and inequality   
Social values and lifestyle    
Governance 
Power relations    
Politics and decision-making   
Energy and 
Technology 
Energy and green technologies   
Environment 
Heatwaves    
Sustainable mobility   
Saharan dust events and air quality   
  
Water management   
Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
19 
4 Scenarios overview for 2040 
Numerous of the deep changes Tenerife is now experiencing are unavoidable and 
permanent. Others are more difficult to forecast and will appear without warning. Tenerife 
can either act as a spectator to those changes or it can try to find their own way forward. 
It has to be decided. 
The three scenarios presented below could help boosting a debate on the future of 
Tenerife’s resilience. Therefore, they are descriptive pathways to incite thinking. The 
scenarios are neither detailed guidelines nor policy recommendations. The scenarios are 
thought to shed light on the capabilities of Tenerife by 2040 to become more resilient 
depending on the choices to be made from now onwards. 
These three scenarios are the following: (1) a first one representing the reference scenario, 
or the ‘business as usual’, leading to increasing vulnerabilities and low resilience; (2) a 
second scenario called ‘awakening’, representing deep changes in social values and the 
way of doing politics and environmental governance, leading to increasing levels of 
resilience; and (3) a last scenario called ‘collaborative communities” that describes what 
could be done when a part of the society decides to become more resilient in a context of 
governmental apathy. 
4.1 Business as usual 
The ‘business as usual’ scenario unfolds an image of Tenerife that assumes deteriorated 
politics, the economic situation and environmental policies. Poor governance is increased 
by degraded politics, powerful stakeholders’ influence (together with a certain social 
approval) and corruption. Public participation in decision-making is low and scarce. Poor 
governance keeps public participation away from decision-making since the public is seen 
as a threat to mainstreaming governance. 
The economic model relies on reduced agricultural activities, and a higher importance of 
both construction and tourism sectors. The first consequence is a decreasing local 
agricultural production that, due to both the increasing local population and tourism 
arrivals, will at least prolong the external food production dependency, leading to a 
vulnerable situation in terms of food sovereignty. 
The use of water remains unsustainably managed. The island cannot provide groundwater 
resources due to its exhausting situation. Water use is increasingly dependent on 
desalination technologies to provide islanders (and economic sectors) with fresh water. 
Therefore, water policy is seen as a technological problem that needs solving, based on 
increasing use of fossil fuels that leads to increasing water prices due to the expected rise 
in the international price of fuel. Consequently, water abstraction and water use will 
continue depending on external energy resources, leading to a vulnerable situation in terms 
of water sovereignty. 
Poor governance will also lead to a continued low renewable energy investment. This lack 
of governmental commitment produces increasing use of fossil fuels. Transport policy will 
continue relying on car use, however, the increasing use of electrification in cars may slow 
down the use of energy for this purpose, partially improving air quality. However, this car-
oriented policy will induce road congestion and other associated impacts of land-transport; 
meanwhile, road infrastructure is foreseen to expand, leading to increasing environmental 
impacts. The tourism sector might also be affected by increasing fossil fuel prices, due to 
the fact that there is no substitution for oil-powered plains. 
Economic costs may increase since fossil fuel prices are foreseen to rise in the coming 
decades, pushing up the energy bill. Furthermore, since the economic model will continue 
relying on both construction and tourism sectors (both potentially subject to increasing 
computerisation), low quality of employment and salaries will linger on, whereas high 
unemployment and poverty rates may become structural. Local population will therefore 
be more vulnerable to extreme weather events not only because of ageing, but also due 
to the lack of resources (income) to deal with climatic threats. 
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4.2 Awakening 
The ‘awakening’ scenario shows an image of Tenerife that assumes a deep change in social 
values as well as the approach to politics and environmental governance. Now, both good 
governance and an environmentally-friendly lifestyle become essential to unfold the 
scenario. Good governance is encouraged by a more active and participatory society that 
demands more participation in decision-making. This participatory approach becomes 
crucial to keep powerful stakeholders’ influence under control and eradicate corruption. 
The economic model begins to change towards renewable energies and efficient 
technologies, as well as agro-ecological production, and high added value within the 
tourism sector. The first consequence of this transitional economic model is an increasing 
local agricultural production. The private sector is now encouraged by governmental 
incentives, reducing external food production dependency that leads to a less vulnerable 
situation in terms of food sovereignty. 
Water culture changes. Now, the unsustainable water management of the past is 
recognised and assumed to change, i.e. islanders and local governments become aware of 
the exhausting situation of water resources. Water is therefore consumed more efficiently 
due to the deployment of new technologies, but especially due to efficient water-pricing. 
Desalination technologies might be understood as a transitional process that helps the 
aquifer to recover in the long term from the current exhausting situation. Therefore, water 
policy changes from the traditional supply-side approach to a demand-side one. The 
increasing use of renewable energies, as seen below, makes desalination a more 
environmentally-friendly activity, gaining water sovereignty as well. 
Good governance leads to increasing levels of renewable energy investments. The 
government assumes the capability of becoming 100 % renewable by 2040, whereas the 
governmental energy planning is adapted to this new target. This governmental 
commitment produces an increasing use of renewable energies leading to remarkable 
drops in air pollution. Transport policy moves to non-motorised transport and public 
transport systems. Cycling and walking infrastructure is promoted within municipalities, 
whereas bus transport is improved in terms of both infrastructure and services. Private 
transport is discouraged by means of pricing and charging schemes when other sustainable 
options are available. In those cases where private transport cannot be substituted, car 
electrification and alternative-fuelled cars are promoted. The tourism sector is subject to a 
public debate while moving towards more sustainable activities. However, this sector might 
be affected by increasing fossil fuel prices since there are no alternative fuels for aviation. 
Economic costs might be reduced since Tenerife tends to be a fossil fuel-free economy. 
Due to the economic model now being mostly based on green technologies, high skilled 
jobs are required (jobs unexpected to be replaced by computerisation). High-skilled 
workers are therefore well-rewarded and the level and quality of employment improves. 
Poverty and ‘low-paid workers’ are reduced as a consequence of more stable jobs and 
higher salaries. The local population might, however, be vulnerable to extreme weather 
events due to population growth and ageing. 
4.3 Collaborative communities 
The ‘collaborative communities’ scenario unfolds an image of Tenerife that assumes a slow 
change in social values produced only within certain groups of organised islanders. The 
way of doing politics and environmental governance remain the same as for the ‘business 
as usual’ scenario. Poor governance is encouraged by degraded politics, powerful 
stakeholders’ influence and corruption, as well as a lack of public participation in decision-
making. Again, decision-makers see public participation in environmental governance as a 
threat to the mainstreaming economic model. 
The economic model relies on a reduced weight of agricultural activities, and a larger 
importance of both construction and tourism sectors as well as the ‘business as usual” 
scenario. Decreasing local agricultural production may occur, due to increasing local 
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demand and tourist arrivals, leading to increasing external food production dependency. 
This panorama encourages Community Supported Agriculture to be expanded fast and 
become relatively relevant by means of small groups of collaborative agricultural economy. 
Water culture changes partially. The unsustainable water resources management of the 
past endured and desalination becomes increasingly relevant, especially fuelled by fossil 
energy sources. However, the alternative collaborative community networks also expand 
to the water sector and start exploring the options of fog-collecting technologies, such that 
the irrigation of agri-food alternative networks could become self-sufficient. 
Poor governance continues and leads to increasing fossil fuel dependency. As a 
consequence of this energy policy apathy, alternative sustainable energy networks become 
more relevant such that alternative movements get organised onto energy sovereignty 
programmes, providing green energy to those alternative community networks. Transport 
policy continues depending on motorised transport due to local Governments are 
committed to expand road infrastructure. Alternative networks may also organise transport 
alternative networks based on car-sharing initiatives. Meanwhile, cycling and walking may 
become increasingly used. The tourism sector continues relying on sun-and-sand resorts, 
and quantity is still preferred than quality. This sector might be affected by increasing fossil 
fuel prices since there is no alternative fuels for aviation. 
Economic costs increase since Tenerife relies basically on fossil fuels. Due to the 
mainstreaming economic model continue depending on construction and tourism sectors, 
low quality jobs are expected to continue. Low-skilled workers are poorly rewarded and 
the level and quality of employment deteriorates due to computerisation. Poverty and ‘low-
paid workers’ might increase as a consequence of unstable jobs and low salaries. However, 
the alternative collaborative networks may exert as a parallel State that might slightly 
compensate the increasing poverty rates, especially within those alternative networks. 
Local population might however be vulnerable to extreme weather events because of 
population growth and ageing. 
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5 Results: three scenarios towards 2040 
5.1 Strategic invariants 
The strategic invariants will be presented first, since they represent the driving forces that 
remain equal to all scenarios (see section 3.2.3). 
5.1.1 Demography 
5.1.1.1 Population growth 
Spain is expected to lose 1.1 million inhabitants from current times (2017) until 2040 (INE, 
2017b). This reduction will be produced as a consequence of increasing death rate and 
reduced birth rate. This negative vegetative balance will neither be compensated by 
migratory balance, even though it is expected to be positive. 
The Canary Islands will be among the six regions in Spain that will increase their population 
from current times until 2031 (there is no population projection beyond this year). The 
Islands will increase their population by almost 108 000 inhabitants, which means 5 % 
more than 2017 (see Figure 2). This increase is characterised by a negative vegetative 
balance and a positive migration. This growth rate is the most intense one in Spain along 
with the Balearics (INE, 2017b). 
Figure 2. Population growth in Spain (2017-2040), Canary Islands and Province of Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife (2017-2031). Harmonised data (base 2017=100) 
 
   Source: INE, 2017b. 
 
A projection for Tenerife is not available, although an estimation for the Province of Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife (comprised of the islands of Tenerife, La Palma, La Gomera and El Hierro 
altogether) is presented in Table 5. The expected population increase for the Province is 
5 % between 2017 and 2031. Nowadays, the island of Tenerife represents 89 % of the 
total province population (ISTAC, 2017g). 
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Table 5. Population projection for the Province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 
Year Province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 
2017 1,028,867 
2020 1,044,671 
2025 1,064,569 
2031 1,080,728 
Source: INE, 2017b. 
5.1.1.2 Ageing population 
According to the projections (INE, 2017b), the Province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife is 
expected to age in 2031 respective to 2017 (see Figure 3). The population pyramid shown 
below is inverting; whereas in 2017 the largest group of population is the one between 40-
44 years old, in 2031 the larger group will be the one between 55-59. Furthermore, in 
2017 there are almost 174 000 people above 65 years old, meanwhile in 2031 an increase 
to more than 259 000 people is expected, i.e. 49 % more. Regarding young people 
(considered here as those below 19 years old), the current population is almost 187 000 
people, whereas in 2031 this group will be reduced to 156 000, i.e. 16 % less. 
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Figure 3. Ageing population in the Province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 2017 (above) and 2031 
(below) 
 
 
 
Source: INE, 2017b. 
5.1.2 Economy 
5.1.2.1 Recovery/recession 
Economic recovery has a high level of uncertainty. Possible changes in United States 
policies, Brexit, monetary policy divergence at the global scale, and upcoming national 
elections in several European Union Member States might be one of the causes (European 
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Commission, 2017; UNCTAD, 2016). According to Figure 4, an expansion of GDP at global, 
regional, and national scale is expected from now on to 2040, although a likely moderation 
in growth rates might occur after 2020 (PwC, 2015). The fastest growth is expected at 
global scale, followed by the OECD states. Spain’s recovery seems to be attached to the 
Eurozone economies. Therefore, a certain level of stability is expected in terms of GDP at 
global, regional, and national level in the long term. 
Figure 4. Gross domestic product long-term forecast (harmonised) 
 
Source: OECD, 2016. 
 
Regarding the Spanish situation, GDP growth is expected to be higher than the one of the 
Eurozone for the next years. The Spanish economic growth will be based on a strong 
domestic demand, including investment in construction, whereas the commitment with 
austerity measures remain (MEIC, 2015), even though it is known to undermine recovery 
(UNCTAD, 2016). Economic growth is expected to decelerate within the next years, 
although an average level of 2 % for 2011-2030 is forecasted (Johansson et al., 2012). At 
the same time, Spanish governments’ debt ratio of 100 % of GDP is foreseen (European 
Commission, 2017). The Canary Islands is expected to increase its GDP growth in the 
coming years, especially as a consequence of both a low oil price context, that reduces air 
transport costs, and the resulting arrivals of tourists (BBVA, 2016). 
Notwithstanding, it has been indicated that the current crisis, due to its systemic character, 
is expected to endure at least to 2020-2025 (Niño-Becerra, 2015). Meanwhile, the 
characteristics of the capitalist system will continue and sharpen, i.e. in order to increase 
efficiency and reduce costs, there will be an increasing trend to create both monopolies 
and oligopolies, leading to an increasing reduction of actors and, therefore, a concentration 
of economic power (Niño-Becerra, 2015). According to this author, the scenario for the 
future of Spain will be the following: 
 
— biased growth: several sectors will experience rapid growth while others will experience 
a rather slow level; 
— demarcated areas and clusters with strong possibilities of economic activity 
representing an important percentage of GDP; 
— development of the 4.0 industrial sector: decoupled from infrastructure and equipment 
oriented to mass production. 
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
1
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
3
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
5
2
0
2
6
2
0
2
7
2
0
2
8
2
0
2
9
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
1
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
3
2
0
3
4
2
0
3
5
2
0
3
6
2
0
3
7
2
0
3
8
2
0
3
9
2
0
4
0
Spain Euro area OECD World
26 
5.1.2.2 Employment/computerisation 
According to Frey and Osborne (2017), within 10-20 years, computerisation, machine 
learning and mobile robotics will progressively substitute human labour, especially those 
employments of low-wage occupations, whereas high-wage occupation will have a lower 
risk of substitution (see Figure 5). Thus, the most probable employments affected by 
computerisation are: workers in transportation and logistics occupations; office and 
administrative support workers; employment in services; sales and construction 
occupations; cashiers; counter and rental clerks; as well as telemarketers. 
However, the workers that are quite likely to be protected from computerisation are the 
ones related to occupations requiring knowledge of human heuristics and creative 
intelligence, such as fine arts, originality, negotiation, persuasion, education, social 
perceptiveness, healthcare, and media jobs. 
Consequently, an economy based on office and administrative support, sales and, related 
service (including tourism), such as in Tenerife and the Canary Islands, are more likely to 
suffer high levels of unemployment in the near future than other economic models 
specialised in high added-value product and services. For more specific details, the annex 
given in Frey and Osborne (2017) can be consulted. 
Figure 5. Employment affected by computerisation 
 
            Source: Frey and Osborne, 2017. 
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5.1.2.3 Energy and green technologies: the international context 
A 30 % rise in global energy demand is expected for 2040 for all fuels (IEA, 2016). Natural 
gas consumption is projected to increase by 50 %, whereas oil demand growth rate will 
slow down but will still reach 103 million barrels a day by 2040 (IEA, 2016). Fossil fuels 
(gas and oil) will continue to be the backbone of the global energy system for the next 
decades (IEA, 2016). However, oil and gas extraction will decay due to the declining 
condition of existing fields (IEA, 2016). In fact, if a 5-7 % decline rate for global post-peak 
output of conventional liquids supply is assumed (see Figure 6), the supply gap would be 
around 41-48 million barrels a day (mbd), which is equivalent to four times the Saudi 
Arabia production capacity (Fustier et al., 2016). Furthermore, if increasing global energy 
demand is assumed (IEA, 2016), the gap would even be larger: to 55-60 mbd (Fustier et 
al., 2016). 
Figure 6. Post-peak production (benign definition) — sensitivity to 5-7 % decline rate to 2040 
 
      Source: Fustier et al., 2016. 
 
World oil prices are therefore estimated to increase continually after 2020 (see Figure 7). 
During 2020-2030 the oil price will rapidly increase at an annual rate of 2.3 % due to both 
economic growth and increasing world motorisation (European Commission, 2016a). 
During 2030-2050 world oil price will keep growing but a slower rate (0.7 % annually) due 
to lower growth of oil consumption encouraged by energy efficiency, deployment of 
biofuels, hybrid vehicles and the substitution of oil by gas for energy production (European 
Commission, 2016a). In 2050, the price of Brent would reach USD 130 2013/barrel 
(European Commission, 2016a), whereas gas import prices are foreseen to be maintained 
(see Figure 7). After 2020, the average European Union gas import price will increase up 
to USD 69 2013/barrel of oil equivalent (boe), whereas in 2050 the price would go up to 
USD 79 2013/boe. 
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Figure 7. Fossil fuel import prices 
 
Source: EC, 2016a. 
 
Renewable energies are expected to become more relevant in the global energy mix. 
Almost 60 % of the power generated in 2040 is projected to come from renewables, half 
of it from wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) (IEA, 2016). There will be a relocation of capital 
to renewable energies, experimenting a fast growth due to a continued cost reduction (IEA, 
2016; see also Figure 8). Solar PV average costs are foreseen to decline by 40-70 % by 
2040, whereas onshore wind by 10-25 % (IEA, 2016). Therefore, subsidies might no longer 
be needed (IEA, 2016). 
Figure 8. Indicative costs for renewable energy technologies 
 
Source: EC, 2016a. 
 
Electricity will have a greater share of final energy consumption (IEA, 2016), whereas 
electric cars will gain attractiveness (exceeding 150 million in 2040) since the cost gap 
between conventional cars and electric ones will narrow. However, over the long term, 
29 
alternative fuels and technologies for freight, aviation transport, and petrochemicals are 
not expected to appear, therefore, these sectors will experience increasing oil consumption 
(IEA, 2016). 
5.1.3 Governance 
5.1.3.1 Power relations 
According to Corral Quintana (2004) power relations and their influence in decision-making 
may be constructed on the basis of both individual stakeholders’ power and their potential 
coalitions. The latter may be performed by means of an equity analysis carried out through 
an equity matrix from which a similarity matrix may be calculated (Munda, 2008). Through 
a mathematical reduction algorithm, building a dendrogram of coalitions may be possible, 
which shows possible stakeholders coalition formation. 
Two analysis carried out in Tenerife, one for air quality (Corral Quintana, 2004), and one 
for sustainable mobility policies (Hernández González and Corral Quintana, 2016) may 
show certain future coalitions and power relations in Tenerife. Regarding the air pollution 
case study, two coalitions may formed (or may have been already) between the agricultural 
and industrial sectors on the one hand, and the electricity supplier and tourism sector on 
the other. However, the energy supplier, the agricultural, industrial, and tourism sector 
might colligate altogether (see Figure 9). According to Corral Quintana (2004) all these 
groups supported a ‘business as usual’ situation regarding the use of renewable energies. 
Figure 9. Dendrogram of coalitions in air quality policies in Tenerife 
 
G1. Supranational institutions 
G2. Local authorities 
G3. Refinery 
G4. Unelco (electricity producer) 
G5. Tourism sector 
G6. Agricultural sector 
G7. Industrial sector 
G8. Media 
G9. Environmentalists 
G10. Neighbourhood associations 
G11. Local population 
G12. Future generations 
Source: Corral Quintana, 2004. 
 
The second case study focused on sustainable mobility policies (Hernández González and 
Corral Quintana, 2016). Using the same approach, these authors came up with a 
dendrogram of potential coalitions (see Figure 10). The most powerful coalition that might 
be formed on the basis of transport policies is the one between the conservative party and 
the construction sector. These two stakeholders might agree on pushing forward a 
transport policy option focused on the expansion of all road transport infrastructure. 
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Figure 10. Dendrogram of coalitions in sustainable mobility policies in Tenerife 
 
Legend: G1. Government of the Canary Islands, G2. Island Council, G3. Transport experts, G4. Nationalist party, 
G5. Conservative party, G6. Labour party, G7. Left party, G8. Green party, G9. Construction sector, G10. 
Automotive dealers, G11. National trade union (CCOO), G12. National trade union (UGT), G13. Local trade union, 
G14. Bus Company, G15. Taxi drivers’ union, G16. Tram Company, G17. Environmentalists, G18. Mobility-
reduced people, G19. Public transport users, and G20. Citizens’ organisations. 
Source: Hernández González and Corral Quintana, 2016. 
5.1.4 Environment 
5.1.4.1 Heatwaves 
Climate in the Canary Islands is mild, due to the influence of the template NNE trade winds 
and the cool waters of the subtropical North Atlantic. These conditions prevent these 
Islands of the extreme weather conditions of the nearby Sahara, the largest and among 
the hottest desert in the world. Episodically, cool trade wind weakens and easterly Saharan 
air reaches the Canaries. These Saharan air masses may prompt high temperatures, drops 
in relative humidity, down to ~15 % (Dorta, 1991) and the presence of suspended desert 
dust. 
These heatwaves are mainly produced between spring and autumn (Dorta, 2007), usually 
reaching temperatures of 44-45 degrees (Dorta, 1991). However, the Island Council of 
Tenerife has considered heatwaves as those temperatures exceeding 30 degrees (Council 
of Tenerife, 2016). Night heat events reach national maximums between 26-30 degrees 
(Dorta, 2007). 
According to Alonso Pérez (2007), these episodes might have acquired more intensity and 
frequency in the Canary Islands since 1970. In fact, according to Figure 11 (right graph), 
the average number of heatwaves has quadrupled since 1994. The left graph in Fig. 11 
also indicates that among the 10 strongest heatwave’s force indexes recorded over the 
whole period, 5 have been detected during 2004-2007. Other authors also mention that a 
general rise of temperatures is expected for the Canary Islands (Martín et al., 2012), 
intensified in upper parts of the islands (Expósito et al., 2015; Martín et al., 2012). 
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Figure 11. Heatwave frequency and intensity in the Canary Islands (1984-2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Sanz et al., 2007. 
 
According to the World Health Organization, the most relevant predisposing factors for 
heat-related illnesses are being elderly, having impaired cognition (such as dementia), pre-
existing diseases, use of certain medications, low level of hydration, living alone, poor 
housing (such as living in a certain building type or on the top floor), the lack of air-
conditioning at home or residential institutions (WHO, 2004). Thus, the last heatwaves 
registered in the Canary Islands have left 13 premature deaths, more than any other 
meteorological hazard (Dorta, 2007). According to section 5.1.1.2, the number of elderly 
people in Tenerife will increase in the future, leading to increasing vulnerability, especially 
in a context of growing frequency of heatwaves in the Islands (Sanz et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the percentage of inefficient buildings in the Canary Islands is high. More 
than 84 % of homes are either F of G energy class, i.e. the lowest in terms of isolation 
efficiency (IDAE, 2015). One apparent solution might be the use of air-conditioning. 
However, since these devices consume conventional energy in the Islands, this measure 
might be considered as maladaptation to climate change (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). 
5.1.4.2 Saharan dust outbreaks 
There are two dust seasons in the Canary Islands, one in winter and other in summer. In 
the winter dust season (November-March) Saharan dust events are associated with the 
easterly winds prompted by the occurrence of high pressure expanding from the North 
Atlantic over Western Europe and North Africa (Alonso Pérez et al., 2011a). These events 
may induce extremely high concentrations at ground level (up to 2 000 µg/m3 have been 
recorded) and are not necessarily associated with high temperatures. Dust concentrations 
have increased by a factor 2 since 1980 due to an enhancement in dust export to the 
Canaries due to a strengthening and eastward shift of the Azores High (Alonso Pérez et al., 
2011b). 
In the summer season (July and August) dust events are associated with the circulation of 
the dusty Saharan Air Layer (SAL) — i.e. the hot and dry airstream that expands from 
North Africa to the Americas — over the Canary Islands. The SAL results in hot, dry and 
dust air between 500 m.a.s.l. and 5 km.a.s.l. over the Canary Islands, whereas trade winds 
prevails below. A unique long term record of aerosol chemistry and dust at Izaña 
Observatory (Tenerife), started 3 decades ago, have shown that this summer dust export 
in the SAL has been modulated by large-scale climate related processes by the so-called 
North African Dipole Intensity (NAFDI), i.e. the intensity of the North African high (over 
Northern Algeria) to the tropical monsoon (Rodríguez et al., 2015). Recent long-term 
analysis (1941-2013) of aerosol optical depth retrievals obtained at Izaña Observatory 
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shows that there is an important multi-decadal variability in summer dust export connected 
to NAFDI and North Atlantic ocean temperature long-term variability (García et al., 2016). 
The Canary Islands have historically received Saharan dust as a consequence of large scale 
meteorological processes that involve mid-latitude waves, the NAFDI and the Saharan Heat 
Low (Cuevas et al., 2016; Rodríguez et al., 2015). Thus, when this event takes place, the 
air of the Canaries become dusty and ‘naturally’ polluted with particulate matter (PM10). In 
addition to the dust events in these two seasons, other scattered and sporadic episodes 
may occur along the year. The effects of climate change on the evolution of Saharan dust 
outbreaks are however under discussion (Alonso Pérez et al., 2007). 
Summer dust events are associated with meteorological conditions that have several 
environmental implications. Aircraft measurements and satellite observations (Prospero 
and Carlson, 1972; Tsamalis et al., 2013) have shown that the dusty, hot and dry Saharan 
Air Layer typically expands between 1 and 5 km.a.s.l. over the ocean. Atmospheric 
soundings have shown that during intense events, the SAL occurs above 500 m.a.s.l. over 
Tenerife, shifting the typical inversion layer associated with the trade winds to lower 
altitudes and resulting in high temperatures in the forest of the Island that typically occurs 
between 600 and 1 800 m.a.s.l. These high temperatures represented an increased risk of 
forest fires, whereas the shifting to low altitudes of the inversion layer is typically 
associated with severe pollution episodes of industrial origin in the metropolitan area, due 
to the emissions of the oil refinery and shipping in the harbour of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 
(Alastuey et al., 2005; CSIC-AEMET-UHU, 2010). 
In terms of socioeconomic impacts, Saharan dust events reduce visibility, affecting both 
airports and their transport services (Dorta, 2007). However, the impacts on human health 
are one of the most relevant ones, since respiratory pathologies, anxiety disorders, and 
atypical thoracic pain usually affect local population (García et al., 2001). Other studies 
have reported allergic diseases leading to increased use of air liquid as a respiratory 
therapy (Belmonte et al., 2010). It has also been testified that Saharan dust events might 
be related to the introduction of microbial communities (González et al., 2013). 
In the next section the scenarios will be unfolded, concretely for those driving forces that 
may be subject to change in the next decades depending on the scenario analysed. 
5.2 Business as usual 
5.2.1 Economy 
5.2.1.1 Food production dependency 
Currently, there is a progressive reduction in the primary sector in the Canary Islands, in 
favour of both the construction and tourism sectors (CES, 2015). Nowadays, the primary 
sector represents only a 1.5 % of the Canaries GDP (CES, 2015). The agricultural surface 
has been reduced in the Islands as well as livestock production (CES, 2015), especially as 
a consequence of difficult farming conditions for younger generations, poor salaries 
compared to other sectors (as construction and tourism), loss of rural traditions, and low 
prestige compared to the tertiary sector (CES, 2008). In Tenerife, agricultural land has 
been reduced a 20 % between 2000 and 2012, whereas agricultural production for export 
has decreased a 23 % (ISTAC, 2017d). Livestock production has however experienced both 
increase (65 % ovine and 8 % porcine) and decrease (71 % rabbits, 28 % bovine, 27 % 
goat, and 2 % hens) (ISTAC, 2017e). 
The primary sector’s shrinking condition is said to be produced as a consequence of growing 
food demand (local communities, immigration and tourism), low competitive prices of local 
production, high production costs (included land), deficient marketing, the interests of 
powerful import stakeholders, and the concentration of agricultural export potential in a 
few products (Godenau and Nuez, 2013; Godenau, 2014), such as banana, tomato and 
cucumbers (CES, 2015; see also Table 6). Furthermore, increasing competition between 
economic sectors (agriculture, residence, industry, infrastructure, and tourism) for land-
33 
use control have also been pointed out as a barrier for local agricultural development (CES, 
2008). Meanwhile, biological agriculture production is not locally promoted (ULL/ULPGC, 
2014), representing 6 % of agricultural surface in Tenerife (ICCA, 2017). 
The so-called POSEI programme (Programme of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular 
Nature of the Canary Islands) and SSA regime (Specific Supply Arrangement) have also 
been appointed as policies that have been discouraging local productive capacity (CES, 
2015). Even though, the POSEI was intended to increase local food production by means 
of subsidies to production and marketing, export-oriented production has captured most 
of those subsidies (Godenau and Nuez, 2013). Whereas SSA was created to reduce import 
prices towards the Canary Islands so that local demand could be satisfied at low prices. 
The consequence of these policies have brought both positive and negative impacts. 
Positive because local fruit and vegetables production have increased, but negative 
because livestock products and their derivatives have been substituted by imports (CES, 
2008; see also Table 6). All in all, food external dependency is growing whereas food self-
sufficiency has been progressively reduced (Godenau, 2014). Only 6 % of products bought 
by local inhabitants have been locally produced (CES, 2009), meaning that Tenerife would 
have supplies for one week in case of blockade (CES, 2008). 
 
Table 6. Self-sufficiency of some products in the Canary Islands 
Product Coverage level (1) 
(1990-1992) 
Coverage level (2004-
2006) 
Meat 21 % 18 % 
Milk 13 % 9 % 
Milk, butter and cheese 11 % 7 % 
Eggs 95 % 77 % 
Honey 27 % 36 % 
Vegetables and legumes (2) 163 % 124 % 
Fruits (3) 214 % 185 % 
Cereals 2 % 1 % 
Wine 27 % 19 % 
(1)  Local production/available supply (the latter considered as import — export + local production). 
(2) Includes tomatoes and cucumbers for export. 
(3) Includes bananas for export. 
Source: CES, 2008. 
5.2.1.2 Tourism sector 
The evolution of tourism in Spain has been characterised by an increase in accommodation 
supply mostly concentrated (80 %) in Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Valencia, the 
Balearics, and Madrid (MITC, 2007). The Canary Islands are one of the most competitive 
tourism resorts within the European Union (Díaz et al., 2005; Fernández and Diaz, 2011; 
Oreja et al., 2008), based on a conventional mass tourism approach that relies on the sun 
and beach product (Oreja et al., 2008). The same model of tourism has also been adopted 
for Tenerife: 5.8 million tourists visited the island in 2016 (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Number of arrivals (to both airports) and number of tourists in Tenerife 
 
                Source: ISTAC, 2017a. 
 
The tourism sector represents in the Canary Islands 32 % of the GDP and this sector 
accumulate 38 % of total employment (Exceltur, 2015). Furthermore, this sector also 
produces ancillary benefits on other sectors of the economy: each EUR 100 of added value 
directly generated in the tourism sector contributes to the generation of an additional 
EUR 50 in other sectors of the economy (Exceltur, 2015). The tourism sector is currently 
recovering in the Canary Islands, as pre-crisis levels have been achieved (CES, 2015). In 
fact, in Tenerife, the number of arrivals has remarkably grown in the last few years (see 
Figure 12). 
However, this model of mass tourism is not sustainable (Martín, 2007). Poor land-use 
planning has favoured a high tourism development such that natural resources are now at 
risk, affecting the value and image of these resorts (MITC, 2007). Mass-tourism models 
externalises pressures on the environment, lost control over waste from cruise ships and 
increased coastal erosion (ECORYS, 2013). In Tenerife, the model of tourism development 
has been attractive to the construction sector such that building development linked to 
tourism have negatively affected the coastline (Oreja et al., 2008). The level of tourism 
pressure in Tenerife has been said to be high (Martín, 2007), representing Puerto de la 
Cruz, Adeje and Arona the Municipalities under most pressure (Fernández and Diaz, 2011). 
One of the consequences of this model of development is overcrowded beaches, traffic 
jams and damaged landscapes (Oreja et al., 2008). Concretely, according to Martín (2007) 
this model of mass tourism has associated a set of socioeconomic and environmental 
negative impacts: 
 
— land speculation and massive coastal development projects; 
— pollution by means of air, boat, and land transport, as well as energy consumption; 
— increasing needs of transport infrastructures; 
— increasing production of waste; 
— increasing food demand (see also section 5.2.1.1); 
— increasing leisure activities within natural spaces. 
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Nowadays, there is a clear situation of oversupply in terms of accommodation in the 
Spanish tourism sector, including the Canary Islands (Exceltur, 2005). However, this 
situation of oversupply (see total number of beds in Figure 13), as well as their associated 
negative social and environmental impacts, could worsen if the land available for additional 
tourism resorts is developed: according to Exceltur (2005) the supply of new beds could 
be tripled in the future. 
Figure 13. Number of beds available in tourist resorts in Tenerife 
 
Source: ISTAC, 2017f. 
 
In terms of vulnerability, the tourism sector has been considered to be vulnerable to certain 
climatic events, such as the eruption of the Eyjafjöll volcano, which had an impact on 
tourist demand (European Commission, 2010). Furthermore, tourism services will 
experience constraints as a consequence of climate change, water scarcity and biodiversity 
pressure especially in mass tourism resorts (European Commission, 2010). 
The tourism sector is also sensible to oil prices, due to the increase in fossil fuel prices 
produce impacts on both the demand and supply side (Exceltur, 2004). Firstly, the demand 
is affected in terms of arrivals, i.e. the higher the price, the lower the arrivals. Meanwhile, 
the supply side is affected in terms of increasing production costs due to the fact that 16 % 
of Spanish tourism running costs are associated to energy consumption. In fact, oil prices 
are expected to rise rapidly during the next two decades (as seen in section 5.1.2.3). 
Furthermore, aviation will not be able to fly with alternative fuels in the coming decades, 
therefore, the sustainability of this sector is undermined. 
In a ‘business as usual’ scenario, the tourism sector could see «a rebirth of economic 
activities based on public investment and a gradual increase in private investment resulting 
from increased confidence of the different social actors. However, [this] revitalization 
patterns are based on pre-crisis behaviour, and the sectoral structure, the business 
activities and associated services maintain the same type of activity as before. Therefore, 
[tourism resorts may recover], but it does not adapt to the new reality of more sustainable 
tourist destinations, which places [Tenerife] in a position of vulnerability to external 
contexts and misses the opportunity of a possible transformation» (Corral et al., 2016, p. 
13). A sun-and-sand tourism model, even with a certain degree of regulation, would not 
be capable of moving towards a more sustainable tourism sector (Oreja et al., 2008). 
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5.2.2 Society 
5.2.2.1 Poverty and inequality 
The unemployment rate in the OECD countries is expected to return to pre-crisis levels 
(Johansson et al., 2012). In the next coming years, Spain will undergo employment rate 
growth close to 2.5 % until 2019 (MEIC, 2015), whereas wages are also foreseen to rise 
(EC, 2017). However, the current Spanish unemployment rate reaches 18.6 % (INE, 
2017a), whereas the level of in-work poverty, or ‘low-paid workers’, is one of the highest 
in the European Union (Padrón et al., 2016). 
In the Canary Islands, job creation has been growing faster than the national average, at 
a rate of 2.8 %, especially in the construction and tourism sectors (BBVA, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the unemployment rate rise up to 24.9 % in the Canary Islands, and up to 
24.3 % in Tenerife (ISTAC, 2017c). Furthermore, the average income in the Canary Islands 
is 18 % lower than the national average, i.e. one of the lowest incomes in Spain (CES, 
2015). 
27.6 % of the population of the Canary Islands are at risk of poverty (CES, 2015), 
considered as those households whose income is lower than the 60 % of the median 
income. This represent one of the six worse regions in Spain (CES, 2015). Moreover, 
66.9 % of households in the Islands are not able to cope with unforeseen expenses, the 
second largest in Spain, whilst almost 60 % are not able to afford holidays, the fourth 
largest in Spain (CES, 2015). Almost one third of children live in relative poverty in the 
Canary Islands. Meanwhile, Tenerife presents indicators of poverty even worse than the 
Canary Islands average (see Table 7). For example, one out of four people are below 
relative poverty in Tenerife, whereas 80 % of households make ends meet with difficulty. 
 
Table 7. Indicators of poverty for the Canary Islands and Tenerife (year 2013) 
Indicator Canary Islands Tenerife 
Households with severe poverty (1) 7.3 % 7.5 % 
Households with moderate poverty (2) 14.1 % 15.3 % 
Households below relative poverty (3) 21.4 % 22.8 % 
Population with severe poverty 6.8 % 7.0 % 
Population with moderate poverty 15.9 % 16.9 % 
Population below relative poverty 22.6 % 23.9 % 
Households making ends meet with difficulty 77.4 % 79.8 % 
Households with child poverty (4) 31.3 % — 
Households with elderly poverty (5) 18.5 % — 
(1) Under EUR 228 a month. 
(2) Between EUR 228 and EUR 456 a month. 
(3) Under EUR 456 a month. 
(4) Children under 6 years old. 
(5) Elderly above 64 years old. 
Source: ISTAC, 2017b. 
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The cause of poverty in the Canary Islands is not said to be the economic crisis, it is rather 
a structural problem that already existed before the economic downturn (Padrón et al., 
2016). Poverty in the Canary Islands is a structural issue as a consequence of the existing 
economic model that relies on low labour productivity, concentrated in the service sector, 
intensive in the use of low-qualified workers (Padrón et al., 2016). Furthermore, the 
salaries in the Canary Islands are lower than those in the rest of Spain even for the same 
job and activity. As a consequence, the Canary Islands is one of the Spanish regions with 
higher levels of in-work poverty (Padrón et al., 2016). 
According to Padrón et al. (2016) a ‘business as usual’ scenario, based on GDP growth 
reliance and palliative measures, will not solve poverty and inequality. Meanwhile, 
according to Frey and Osborne (2017), as seen in section 5.1.2.2, an economic model 
based on low-wage salaries may suffer high unemployment rates in one or two decades as 
a consequence of computerisation. Assuming, therefore, a ‘business as usual’ scenario, the 
social context for the future might be the following (Niño-Becerra, 2015): 
 
— unemployment equilibrium: at least at the beginning, until the quantity of factors of 
production are required in each concrete period of time; 
— underemployment of labour factor: due to surplus labour in a context of decreasing 
demand for labour; 
— high structural unemployment: as a consequence of computerisation; 
— end of the middle class: understood as a united group of people with productive 
employment and a sufficient wage to satisfy their needs; 
— progressive evolution to the 1/3 society: 1/3 will be excluded, 1/3 will be partially 
required for production processes, and 1/3 will be required. 
5.2.2.2 Social values and lifestyle 
Regarding social values, the ‘business as usual’ scenario is comprised of a general 
individual and collective blindness with respect to current social and environmental 
problems (Aguilera, 2001). Moreover, the perception of the need to protect social and 
environmental problems might be reduced due to the economic crisis: during economic 
downturns, local residents tend to underestimate social and environmental impacts of 
economic activities, whereas they tend to overestimate economic benefits (Garau et al., in 
press). 
Local islanders see the agricultural sector as an activity characterised by a low social 
prestige, whereas newer generations have already lost the traditional contact with local 
rural culture (Godenau, 2014). 
The lifestyle in the Canary Islands is far from being sustainable. If the whole planet would 
assume the lifestyle of the Canaries islanders, almost four Earth planets would then be 
required to satisfy their social and economic needs (Fernández and Diaz, 2011). However, 
people tend to believe that technology and science will solve all environmental, social, and 
economic problems (Aguilera, 2001). Therefore, there is no need to change the current 
lifestyle. 
5.2.3 Governance 
5.2.3.1 Politics and decision-making 
According to Aguilera (2007), decision-making in the Canary Islands, including the island 
councils and some municipalities, is essentially authoritarian (see its characteristics in 
Table 8), especially where the expansion of infrastructure is involved, e.g. transport and 
land-use. These authoritarian decisions do not respond to the public interest (Aguilera, 
2003) but to concrete economic ones (Aguilera, 2009; see also section 5.1.3.1). In most 
cases, infrastructure projects in the Canary Islands are said to be an excuse to invest public 
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funds to pay back previous favours to companies which have funded political parties 
(Aguilera, 2009). In fact, the Canary Islands have been reported to be the second region 
in Spain with more corruption cases per municipality, ahead of Madrid and Valencia (Jerez 
et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, there is a deliberate interest in showing that democracy is only the act 
of voting (Aguilera, 2007), whereas citizen participation is thought as a formality that 
needs to be mentioned by politicians as an afterthought in land-use planning (Aguilera, 
2003). Therefore, the islands are currently in a situation of environmental, social and 
democratic degradation (Aguilera, 2001). 
To sum up, the environmental decision-making panorama for the Canary Islands may be 
characterised by the following (Aguilera, 2003, 2007): 
 
— lack of public debate in policy-making processes; 
— public ‘information and consultation’ is a formality in land-use planning, two of the 
lowest rungs on Arnstein ladder of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969); 
— unpunished violation of environmental legislation; 
— frequent common economic interests between decision-makers and construction 
companies, potentially involved in public works; 
— wasted public funds in unnecessary infrastructure expansion. 
 
Table 8. Authoritarian versus democratic environmental governance 
Authoritarian Democratic 
Options? Legitimation Options? Legitimation 
 Solutions are 
predefined 
before framing 
the issue 
 Given by 
‘experts’ 
 Citizens bear the 
responsibility of 
testing the 
viability of the 
project 
 What is the 
problem? 
 What are the 
key questions to 
be formulated? 
 Creation of an 
space for argued 
public debate 
 Project 
promoters bear 
the responsibility 
of testing the 
viability of the 
project 
 The unique 
solution has 
been previously 
decided and a 
posteriori 
justified 
 Not independent 
experts 
 The payer rules 
 There is no 
argued debate 
 What are the 
priorities? 
 What are the 
alternative 
options? 
 Who funds the 
project? 
 Who chooses the 
experts? 
 What are the 
values and 
interests at 
stake? 
 Is the project 
necessary? 
 Consultation 
spaces and 
deliberation 
 Citizen juries 
 Scientific juries 
with 
independent 
experts and 
citizens 
 Protest rallies 
Source: Aguilera, 2003. 
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5.2.4 Energy and technology 
5.2.4.1 Energy and green technologies 
In 2015, the Canary Islands were planned to cover 30 % of their net electricity generation 
with renewable energies (DGIE, 2007). However, the current level of renewable energy 
generation on the grid is around 8 % (CEICC, 2016). In the case of Tenerife, 30.6 % of 
net electricity generation was also planned to be covered by renewables by 2015 (DGIE, 
2007), however, nowadays, only 8 % of the renewables generation are introduced on the 
grid (CEICC, 2016) (1). Since the electricity generation on the grid does not consider 
transport and distribution electricity losses, net electricity renewable production should be 
even lower. 
In terms of primary energy, renewable energies were foreseen to cover 8.1 % of total 
demand for 2015 in the Canary Islands (DGIE, 2007). Today, the level of renewables in 
the total primary energy is less than 1.5 % (CEICC, 2016). Regarding natural gas, the 
Government of the Canary Islands projected a 20 % coverage of total primary energy, 
whereas the rest would be supplied by oil (DGIE, 2007). 
Under this scenario, a continuation of the current energy policy is assumed for 2040, i.e. 
fossil fuels, either oil or gas, will be the main component of the energy mix. 
5.2.5 Environment 
5.2.5.1 Land-based transport planning 
There are in Tenerife three main urban agglomerations that have the largest populations, 
most economic activities and the majority of inter-urban trips with distances between 
40 km (from the North to the metropolitan area) to 80 km (from the metropolitan area to 
the Southwest). Thus, the island functions like a large sprawling city that accumulates 4.5 
million hours lost in congestion only in the metropolitan area and its surroundings, costing 
EUR 109 million a year (Hernández González, 2014). Motorised mobility in cities is 
expected to double between current times and 2050 as well as transport emissions, despite 
the significant technological improvements within the transport sector (OECD/ITF, 2017). 
Meanwhile, the European Commission calculates that congestion costs might increase 
about 50 % by 2050 under business as usual trends (European Commission, 2011b). 
According to the regional government, the island’s road transport system is a clear example 
of unsustainable development (Government of the Canary Islands, 2003); however, the 
same Government has expanded the Island’s road infrastructure as a response to high 
congestion (Ramos, 2005). One of the consequences of this infrastructural-based policy is 
that the land-based transport public administration expenses surpasses the revenues 
produced by the own transport system by at least EUR 11 million a year (Hernández-
González, 2016). 
Work, educational and leisure activities are the main purposes of inter-urban trips, with 
62 % of these trips being made by car, while alternative transport means (bus, coach, 
tram, and taxi) account for 18 % and car-pooling for 19 % (Table 9). 
In the late 1990s, the Island Council started to design a tramway as an alternative to road 
transport that would help improve the public transport system (Council of Tenerife, 2006a). 
In addition, a new road network was proposed to guarantee traffic continuity on the Island 
(Council of Tenerife, 2006b). Even though new road infrastructures can encourage new 
demand patterns and greater car use (Marina and Marrero, 2012), it was considered (and 
it is still today) the solution to island’s congestion issues. 
                                           
(1) The authors are aware that the units of measurement are different; but the same units of measurement for 
proper comparisons could not be found. Thus, net electricity generation represents electricity production, 
less losses as well as the energy used during electricity generation (DGIE, 2007). Electricity on the grid 
represents the energy introduced on the electricity grid, less the energy used during the electricity 
generation; thus losses are not considered (CEICC, 2016). 
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Table 9. Land-based inter-urban transport patterns in Tenerife 
Means of transport Trip purpose 
Car 
Car-pooling 
Bus 
Tram 
Coach 
Taxi 
Motorcycle 
62 % 
19 % 
9 % 
4 % 
3 % 
2 % 
1 % 
Work 
Leisure 
Study 
Shopping 
Personal affairs 
Visiting doctor 
Accompany another person 
Take children to school 
Work affairs 
Others 
37 % 
14 % 
14 % 
9 % 
8 % 
4 % 
3 % 
3 % 
1 % 
7 % 
Source: Council of Tenerife, 2012b. 
 
Nowadays, over 15 years later, these two plans have still not been completely 
implemented. Moreover, newer plans have been developed but not yet applied, due to 
either financial restrictions or social opposition, such as the southern railway infrastructure 
(Council of Tenerife, 2015), the northern railway infrastructure (Council of Tenerife, 2012a) 
and the transport coordination policy (Council of Tenerife, 2012b). Thus, Tenerife’s 
transport policies might be described as a collection of disperse transport policies leading 
to a range of easily noticeable transport impacts in Tenerife (Hernández González and 
Corral Quintana, 2016). 
This model of transportation has being said to be conditioned by fossil fuel energy limits 
(Calero, 2016). According to this author, the proposal of railways for Tenerife does not 
provide any advantage to the sustainability of the local transport system due to: (1) the 
rigidity of this model of transport; (2) its high environmental impacts; and (3) the need to 
go through municipalities by means of tunnels, producing isolation to many populated 
areas of Tenerife, such that many citizens would be obliged to drive their cars until the 
closest train station, increasing travel time and costs (Calero, 2016). 
Under this scenario, a car-centred transport policy is assumed to continue, as presented 
in Figure 14, as well as its associated environmental and social drawbacks. 
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Figure 14. Land-based transport indicators for Tenerife 
 
    Source: ISTAC, 2017h. 
5.2.5.2 Air quality 
Regarding air pollution, there is evidence of impacts of air pollution in Tenerife. The Hospital 
Universitario de Canarias and the Izaña Atmospheric Research Centre found that exposure 
to ultrafine particles is associated with hospital admissions due to heart failure 
(Domínguez-Rodríguez et al., 2011), whereas black carbon has been associated with Acute 
Coronary Syndrome (Domínguez-Rodríguez et al., 2015, 2016). Other studies have also 
observed relationships between NO2 and the ejection capacity of the heart (Domínguez-
Rodríguez et al., 2013a) and between SO2 and obstructive lesions and Acute Coronary 
Syndrome (Domínguez-Rodríguez et al., 2013b). 
Concentrations of potential pollutant particles in pine forests have also been detected in 
Tenerife, possibly related to traffic emissions as well as sulphur transported from the 
industrial areas of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Candelaria (Tausz et al., 2005). Meanwhile, 
it is also known that the exposure of vegetation to O3 might imply injuries in Tenerife’s 
vegetation (Guerra et al., 2004). 
The most important sources of air pollutants in Tenerife are located along the eastern coast 
of the island (harbour and oil refinery in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Caletillas and Granadilla 
power plants). The prevailing NNE trade winds coupled with the inland sea breeze blowing 
during daylight prompts the inlands transport of these pollutants. In Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife, the inland sea breeze blowing results in the inland transport of the SO2 plumes 
from the refinery and from harbour, prompting fumigations of SO2, sulphuric acid and 
ultrafine particles to the population of the city from 10 to 17 GMT (González and Rodríguez, 
2013; Rodríguez et al., 2008). This situation worsens under summer SAL conditions due 
to the concentration of the air pollutants at low altitudes linked to the downward shifts of 
the inversion layer and to heterogeneous reactions between pollutants and Saharan dust 
(Alastuey et al., 2005; CSIC-AEMET-UHU, 2010). A similar scenario occurs in the Valley of 
Güímar, where the inland NNE winds drag the pollutants transported from the metropolitan 
area and emitted in Candelaria power plant to the interior of the valley to the central ridge 
that crosses the island. In fact, traces of these air pollutants are transported upward across 
the forests to Izaña Observatory at 2 400 m.a.s.l., where they are detected during the 
upward upslope winds (García et al., 2014; Rodríguez et al., 2009). This transport of air 
pollutants within the Güímar Valley has implications on the residential areas. 
Local governmental policies to deal with air pollution are restricted to technological 
improvements in both transport policies and industrial pollution (SIMAC, 2008). However, 
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car electrification might imply certain improvement in air quality in the island hotspots 
associated to exhaust emissions, such as Santa Cruz de Tenerife. 
5.2.5.3 Water governance 
Historically, water management in Tenerife has been done in a sustainable way, i.e. there 
was a potential water availability (Aguilera et al., 2000). Until the 19th century, surface 
water in the Canary Islands was a public and common resource that was then privatised 
and transformed into a commodity. Then, agricultural export crops induced groundwater 
pumping to increase profits, leading to the disappearance of most surface water courses. 
The increasing competition for water resources to be allocated to the export crops industry 
produced increasing withdrawals that caused aquifer over-exploitation as well as its 
ecological damage. This is what has been called ‘social construction of scarcity’ of water 
resources in Tenerife (Aguilera et al., 2000), which is currently aggravated by continuous 
drought conditions in the Canary Islands (Veza, 2001). 
Nowadays, groundwater reserve depletion has reached about 2 km3 (Custodio et al., 
2016). The exploitation is being so aggressive that if today groundwater abstraction 
activities cease, the recovery time of groundwater resources would take up to a century 
(Custodio et al., 2016). 
One of the consequences of the over-exploitation and reduced rainfall has been the need 
for new technologies and desalination of sea and brackish waters with fossil fuels (Aguilera 
et al., 2000; see also Figure 15). These technologies are intensive in energy use, 
consuming nearly 12 % of total electricity at a cost of EUR 200 million a year (Schallenberg 
et al., 2014), even though desalination energy efficiency is improving fast (Sadhwani and 
Veza, 2008). It is believed that this desalination dependence will continue in the future 
(Veza, 2001), whereas its dependence on conventional energy is said to be a major 
drawback (Schallenberg et al., 2014). This artificial abstraction of water has resulted in a 
lower social perception of the need for water management (Aguilera et al., 2000), leading 
to a loss of ‘water culture’ (Custodio et al., 2016). 
Figure 15. Water catchment in the Canary Islands, by source (1 000 m3) 
 
   Source: ISTAC, 2017i. 
 
To sum up, this socially constructed scarcity of water resources in Tenerife is characterised 
by the following aspects (Aguilera et al., 2001; Aguilera and Sánchez, 2005; EEA, 2009b): 
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— management of water resources focused on a supply-side approach; 
— farming centred on bananas, which require large amount of water; 
— water losses. Up to 29 % of the water distributed through the network in the Canary 
Islands is lost before being consumed (see also Figure 16); 
— private ownership of water conditioned by the rules of competition among drillings 
(‘first come, first served’ approach); 
— unequal distribution of ownership. Currently, few powerful owners control most of water 
resources (80 %), whereas a large number of smallholders possess little; 
— lack of public control over water withdrawals such that water rights could be 
guaranteed; 
— lack of control and management practices: until recently, massive amounts of water 
were dumped in the sea to prevent price reductions in summertime; 
— reduced water quality as a consequence of overexploitation, infiltration of fertilisers and 
pesticides, and lack of sewage treatment systems in many parts of the island. Some 
municipalities have traditionally had high concentration of nitrates in the public water 
supply as a consequence of intensive farming activities and the use of nitrated fertilisers 
(Caballero et al., 2003). 
 
Figure 16. Water distributed in the Canary Islands, by sector (year 2014) 
 
NB: losses refer to the ones produced within the distribution network, failures, fraud, measurement errors and 
consumption not measured. 
Source: ISTAC, 2017i. 
 
In the next Figure 17, the ‘business as usual’ scenario is unfolded. Blue boxes represent 
strategic invariants; the grey box represents critical uncertainty; yellow boxes represent 
driving forces that are both strategic invariants and critical uncertainties; lastly, orange 
boxes indicate the outcome of the scenario.  
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Figure 17. Unfolding the ‘business as usual’ scenario 
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5.3 Awakening 
5.3.1 Economy 
5.3.1.1 Reduced food production dependency 
This scenario assumes the European Union’s declaration on ‘A Better Life in Rural Areas’ 
establishing a new agricultural policy for the coming decades (EU, 2016). One of these 
policy orientations point out the need to strength rural value chains and local productive 
networks, especially to give support to fossil-free economies; whereas quality of life in 
rural areas will also be promoted so as to meet the aspiration of younger generations to 
be well-rewarded in agricultural-related employments. 
Even though self-sufficiency in food production can neither be reached to all products nor 
without assuming high opportunity costs in the Canary Islands (CES, 2008, 2009), an 
increase in local food production is possible and desired so as to reduce the current external 
dependency and vulnerability in terms of oil shocks and environmental pollution (CES, 
2008). According to Godenau (2014), agricultural resilience in the Canary Islands would 
probably imply a certain amount of self-sufficiency, which means something in between 
full independency and full dependency (2). Therefore, this ‘in-between’ scenario is here 
assumed since it reflects a more flexible economy that may easily adapt to either internal 
or external disaster-related shocks, e.g. compensating local production by imports when 
internal shocks are produced and the other way around. 
This scenario undertakes concrete self-sufficiency targets as suggested in CES (2015). 
These targets are collectively established. The ‘awakening’ scenario also adopts efficient 
agricultural policies (CES, 2008), i.e. the POSEI and the rural development programme 
would focus on production intended to satisfy the internal market (Godenau and Nuez, 
2013). Rural land will be more protected (CES, 2008), by means of land-use planning 
oriented to reduce urban sprawl (Godenau and Nuez, 2013). Access to agricultural land is 
also encouraged (CES, 2008), for example, through land banks managed by local 
governments (Godenau and Nuez, 2013). Access to water would also be important (CES, 
2008), since consumption for irrigation is expected to grow under this scenario. Machín 
and López (2011) point out that: (1) efficient water distribution (i.e. reduce water losses 
across the water network); (2) improved irrigation efficiency (water input requirements 
should decrease per agricultural output); (3) improved water commercialisation system; 
and (4) increased water treatment would be required, and assumed for this scenario. 
Furthermore, due to local agricultural production is assumed to increase, the use of 
fertilisers too. Therefore, an increasing use of manure from livestock, as well as compost 
would also be needed (Machín and López, 2011). 
Commercialisation and fiscal policies are improved. Industrial policies are used to 
encourage the industrial transformation of the primary sector (Godenau and Nuez, 2013). 
Short distribution channels are encouraged so as to give more importance to the proximity 
of local products (Godenau and Nuez, 2013), for instance, facilitating a direct link between 
producers and consumers by means of street markets, for example (Godenau, 2014). 
Awareness-raising is also assumed in order to promote the environmental quality of local 
products, providing information on the added value of local products, such as origin, 
identity and cultural integrity (Godenau, 2014). Meanwhile, bio-agricultural techniques 
receive more attention and subsidies so as to consider their external benefits. 
Under this scenario, increasing levels of self-sufficiency, more employment and added 
value, landscape protection, and reduced desertification are therefore presumed (CES, 
2008), as well as an increasing contribution of agricultural activities as a keeper of territory 
protection and ‘gardeners of nature’ (Custodio et al., 2016). 
                                           
(2) Godenau (2014) highlights that full production independency may increase vulnerability due to local 
production chains may be impacted by extreme weather events (such as droughts and floods). 
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5.3.1.2 Tourism sector 
In this scenario, the tourism sector is assumed to continue relying on the sun-and-beach 
product, however, several changes are presumed to occur. There is an increasing need to 
reconcile tourism and sustainability (European Commission, 2010). «Traditional mass 
tourism, like sun-and-sand resorts, has reached a steady growth stage. In contrast, 
ecotourism, nature, heritage, cultural, and soft adventure tourism, as well as sub-sectors 
such as rural and community tourism are taking the lead in tourism markets and predicted 
to grow most rapidly over the next two decades. It is estimated that global spending on 
ecotourism is increasing at a higher rate than the industry-wide average growth» (UNWTO, 
2012, p. 28-29). Thus, under this scenario, tourism stakeholders would consider climate 
change impacts and the scarcity of water resources, as well as the need to reduce pressure 
on biodiversity and cultural heritage (European Commission, 2010). However, to move 
towards a more sustainable tourism (or less unsustainable one) «would require 
modification of the flows of mass tourism that occur in a destination with a higher than 
normal level of control exerted by authorities» (Oreja et al., 2008, p. 56). 
Ecotourism might then be seen as an option to attract eco-conscious tourists, by means of 
offering local products as well as environmental-friendly business practices (European 
Commission, 2014b; ECORYS, 2013). Under this scenario, several measures are assumed 
to be taken, such as (European Commission, 2014b): (1) an improvement of resource 
efficiency; (2) a reduction of waste and emissions; (3) an improvement of water efficiency; 
and (4) the development of cultural heritage based tourism and nature in coastal areas. 
Thus, this scenario follows the essential initiatives proposed by the European Commission’s 
tourism strategy regards clean energy, sustainable transport and sustainable water use 
(European Commission, 2010), as well as the one proposed by the Spanish Ministry of 
Tourism (MITC, 2007). 
Tourists seeking environmental and culturally destinations are willing to pay more 
(UNWTO, 2012). Therefore, shifting to a more sustainable (or less unsustainable) tourism 
model may create new jobs, especially related to energy, waste and water efficiency 
(UNWTO, 2012). This scenario may fit with a proposal for a more sustainable tourism in 
mature touristic destinations in Tenerife: «after the crisis resurfaces with a proposal of 
structural changes and a renewed commitment to being a sustainable tourist destination. 
The previous territorial and sectoral planning is changed radically, and there is a strong 
commitment to sustainable and innovative activities, […] with high added value» (Corral 
et al., 2016, p. 13). However, before going any further, this scenario may adopt two 
measures to divert the pathway to a more sustainable tourism: (1) a strategic management 
of tourism through the local communities; and (2) an analysis of tourism carrying capacity. 
A strategic management of tourism in Tenerife is initially adopted. This strategy includes 
the various stakeholders’ interests and tries to reach a consensus over certain economic, 
social and environmental objectives (Oreja et al., 2008); whereas the Spanish Ministry of 
Tourism pointed out the need to develop an assessment of the tourism carrying capacity 
by means of economic, social, and environmental criteria (MITC, 2007). The same 
measures have been proposed elsewhere (Martín, 2007). The World Tourism Organization 
defines tourism carrying capacity as ‘the maximum number of people that may visit a 
tourist destination at the same time, without causing destruction of the physical, economic 
and socio-cultural environment and an unacceptable decrease in the quality of visitors 
‘satisfaction’ (3). This measure is currently under discussion among residents so as to 
mitigate negative effects of mass tourism expansion (Hernandez et al., 2017). Hoteliers 
may give support to this measure due to prices tend to increase as a consequence of the 
limitation in the accommodation supply (Oreja et al., 2008). 
                                           
(3) Cited in Coccossis et al. (2002). 
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5.3.2 Society 
5.3.2.1 Poverty and inequality 
As seen in the ‘business as usual’ scenario, poverty in the Canary Islands is related to the 
economic model, instead of lack of resources redistribution. The economic model is 
currently based on both the construction and tourism sectors, both founded on low labour 
productivity (Padrón et al., 2016), as well as high substitution risks by computerisation 
(Frey and Osborne, 2017). Thus, one way to increase the efficiency of the economy might 
be a structural change towards sectors where jobs are stable and workers are well-
rewarded (Padrón et al., 2016). Therefore, the ‘awakening’ scenario assumes a take-off 
towards a different economic model that relies, especially, on a high-skilled sector such as 
the renewable energy industry (see section 5.3.4.1). Moreover, the agricultural (see 
section 5.3.1.1) and water (see section 5.3.5.3) sectors would also be encouraged under 
this scenario. Meanwhile, the tourism sector would be subject to an open public discussion 
to define a more sustainable path (see section 5.3.1.2). 
According to the Technological Institute of the Canary Islands (ITC, 2008), there are at 
least three sectors that may have future opportunities in the Canary Islands (see Table 
10). They are water management, renewable energies and sustainable tourism. According 
to the European Commission, investing in water management, insulation and energy 
efficiency of buildings, eco-tourism, and organic farming might involve future opportunities 
for job creation (European Commission, 2014c). 
 
Table 10. Potential technological development 
High potentiality 
Priority Sector Goal 
1 Water extraction Reduce the environmental impacts of desalination 
2 Tourism: reinvent the sector Innovation and sustainability to improve tourism resorts 
3 Water treatment and reuse Minimise the environmental impacts of water treatment 
and increase the use of purified water 
Medium potentiality 
1 Water consumption Minimise water use 
2 Water distribution Minimise water losses and produce micro hydro energy 
from the distribution network 
3 Tourism: new markets Change tourism demand towards eco-tourism 
Emerging potentiality 
1 Energy: solar PV panels for 
buildings 
Maximise building space to generate renewable energy 
2 Energy: big wind turbines Maximise renewable energy production in places with 
slow wind speed 
3 Energy: bioclimatic 
architecture 
Minimise the use of energy through passive measures, 
such as passive solar building design and isolation 
Source: Own elaboration based on ITC, 2008. 
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Meanwhile, the European Environment Agency indicates, in its last report on renewable 
energies, the outstanding case of El Hierro Island regarding the construction of the hydro-
wind power plant (EEA, 2016a). This initiative has increased El Hierro’s energy self-
sufficiency whereas this new energy system provides ancillary benefits in terms of water 
supply challenges and pollution mitigation. Increasing the use of renewables would be a 
source of job creation (European Commission, 2012; EEA, 2016b), whereas an economy 
based on both water management and renewable energies will need high-skilled workers 
(European Commission, 2012, 2014c), leading to a more resilient economy to business 
cycles (European Commission, 2014c). 
5.3.2.2 Social values and lifestyle 
The ‘awakening’ scenario assumes exactly the opposite values presented in the ‘business 
as usual’ scenario (see section 5.2.2.2). Now, social values and lifestyle are in line with 
resilience and sustainable principles. These desires have been stated during a series of 
focus group sessions carried out in November 2016 in Tenerife (see Table 11). Those 
sessions were used to detect, together with local citizens, scenario pathways for the future 
of Tenerife in the field of resilience and climate change adaptation strategies. 
 
Table 11. Citizen statements given during focus group sessions in Tenerife 
«I see a greater awareness regarding responsible consumption; I think it is essential to 
be aware of what we can contribute, simply by consuming less. Of course, this has to do 
with the responsible use, or the sustainable use, of local resources». 
«What we have to do is to become aware that we have to change». 
«There has to be an important awareness within our society». 
«I believe that, by 2040, we will all have another type of consciousness». 
«Collective intelligence involves an incredible power». 
Source: Hernandez et al., 2017. 
 
Therefore, a more active society in decision-making is assumed, especially when they are 
called to participate in environmental governance (see the next section 5.3.3.1). These 
social values demand sustainable policies as well as policies for a more resilient island. 
Governmental accountability is demanded, whereas local citizens require a strict 
governmental control over lobbies and political corruption. 
5.3.3 Governance 
5.3.3.1 Politics and decision-making 
Under this scenario, politics and decision-making represent the opposite of the ‘business 
as usual’ scenario (see section 5.2.3.1). The ‘awakening’ scenario would instead rely on 
democratic decision-making approaches (right-hand side in Table 8). This alternative way 
of environmental decision-making is encouraged by the new social values of local society 
(see section 5.3.2.2). Now, decision-makers are willing to change the way environmental 
governance is conducted (Aguilera, 2003), such that: (1) key questions are formulated 
during decision-making processes (what is the real problem to be analysed?), whereas a 
range of viable alternative options are also considered to solve environmental problems 
(what are the (full range of) options to solve the problem?); (2) argued public debates are 
promoted and independent experts are allowed to participate (including citizens), in order 
to clarify the environmental problems at hand, as well as the existing conflicts and 
stakeholders’ interests. 
49 
Environmental decision-making takes therefore the form of a ‘social robust knowledge 
approach’ (Hernández-González and Corral, 2017) under this scenario. This approach (see 
Figure 18) consists of two steps: a first one aimed at developing a participatory process 
followed by a social evaluation of the robustness of the decision-making procedure 
outcomes. It is based on the concepts of participation and transparency: (1) participation 
is produced in both the assessment and post-assessment processes due to stakeholders 
and interested citizens are engaged in the environmental governmental process from the 
very beginning of the process until the end of it; (2) meanwhile, even though transparency 
is also produced in both processes, it becomes more relevant in the post-assessment stage 
of issues, where a social validation of results take place. 
Figure 18. Social robust knowledge approach 
 
Source: Hernández-González and Corral, 2017. 
5.3.4 Energy and technology 
5.3.4.1 Energy and green technologies 
In this scenario, fossil fuel (oil and gas) prices are also assume to rise rapidly in the next 
two decades (see section 5.1.2.3). Within the international context, the deployment of 
renewables, energy efficiency, and electric car use are also assumed to become 
increasingly important. Renewable energy costs are also expected drop and therefore 
become more attractive. 
Contrary to the ‘business as usual’ scenario, renewable energies are assumed to be 
explored in Tenerife as much as technologically possible. According to the European 
Commission, a scenario trend towards decarbonisation by 2050 is possible, and implies, 
first of all, improving energy efficiency, especially by means of eco-buildings and land-use 
planning. Whereas, a second minimum requirement is to switch to renewable energy 
sources. In 2030, the share of renewables may reach 30 % of gross final energy 
consumption. Whereas, by 2050, wind energy should be the main provider of electricity 
(European Commission, 2011a). This conclusions are also supported by the European 
Environment Agency. Thus, for example, economical competitive wind energy potential 
amounts to more than three times the projected demand in 2020 (EEA, 2009a). 
The Canary Islands enjoy a rich supply of renewable energy sources especially from wind 
and sun natural resources (Ramos et al., 2007; Santamarta et al., 2014). In fact, «if the 
available roof area is used for PV [photovoltaics] purposes, a considerable part of the 
electricity demand could be met by solar energy» (Schallenberg-Rodríguez, 2013, p. 238). 
According to Santamarta et al., (2014), the Canary Islands amount large biomass 
potential, such that rural areas could become self-sufficient by means of small biomass-
powered plants. The case study of El Hierro Island has also been mentioned by the 
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European Environment Agency as a successful outstanding example of how to implement 
innovative self-sufficient energy systems (EEA, 2016a). 
The Canary Islands have sufficient potential for a fully renewable energy supply of power, 
heat, and land transport energy demand by 2050, whereas the projected gas infrastructure 
could be completely substituted by renewable energy technologies (Gils and Simon, 2017). 
«This changing nature of renewables requires changes in policy parallel to their further 
development» (European Commission, 2011a, p. 10). According to Gils and Simon (2017), 
a carbon neutral archipelago, 100 % renewable energy supply could be reached by means 
of: 
 
— a strong increase in the installation of wind and PV capacities in the short-term; 
— doubling wind capacity until 2020 and again by 2025; 
— tripling current PV installations by 2020 and doubling by 2025; 
— further development of wave energy, floating offshore wind (in case of grid isolation; 
see Table 12), and stationary fuel cells; 
— a strong increase in energy efficiency, especially in the transport sector. 
 
Table 12. Power plant and grid capacities for 2050 in Tenerife (MW) 
Renewable technology RE Base Grid+ 
PV 2 876 2 876 
Wind offshore floating 1 414 0 
Wind offshore fix 428 163 
Wind onshore 388 388 
Combined cycle gas turbines 197 123 
Total 5 303 3 550 
NB: RE Base refers to grid connections between islands limited to those currently available, planned or considered 
as technically feasible. This implies a possible exchange between Tenerife and La Gomera only. Grid+ refers to 
an enhanced grid extension between all islands, thus providing one integrated power system over the entire 
archipelago. 
Source: Gils and Simon, 2017. 
 
This scenario could be reached either by connecting all islands in the Canaries (Grid+) or 
by connecting some islands (as presented in the RE Base). The RE(ference), base scenario, 
for Tenerife would imply a connection between Tenerife and La Gomera, leading to an 
increasing need of grid capacities across Tenerife. In a Grid+ scenario the needs would be 
lowered since excess of demand could be satisfied importing energy from the other islands 
(Gils and Simon, 2017). 
5.3.5 Environment 
5.3.5.1 Land-based transport planning 
Even though transport demand is assumed to increase, buses and mass transit transport 
systems might cover more than 50 % of the total future demand (OECD/ITF, 2017). Cities 
have a great potential to move towards a more sustainable transport by means of 
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developing walking, cycling, public transport and vehicles powered by alternatives fuels 
(European Commission, 2013a). In order to do so, three strategies are assumed to be 
undertaken within this scenario: (1) avoid unnecessary transport demand; (2) shift to 
sustainable transport options; and (3) improve efficiency. These three strategies are called 
the ASI approach, Avoid, Shift and Improve (EEA, 2016c). 
‘Avoid’ implies to rethink if current transport demand is needed. New technologies may 
help to reduce unnecessary mobility, such as teleworking, online shopping, etc., whereas 
an optimisation of closeness between inhabitants and production and leisure activities is 
assumed to be adopted (Calero, 2016). ‘Shift’ implies a change from unsustainable 
transport to more environmental-friendly transport systems, such as walking and cycling, 
or public transport. First of all, cycling and bus infrastructures would need expansion 
(Calero, 2016). Secondly, tax distortions and unjustified subsidies are eliminated, whereas 
urban road pricing schemes are applied in order to encourage more sustainable transport 
choices (European Commission, 2011b). Fossil fuel taxation (based on the ‘polluter-pays 
principle’), low transit fares and land-use policies limiting urban sprawl are also considered 
under this scenario (European Commission, 2011b; OECD/ITF, 2017). Public transport 
choices are widely available as well as walking and cycling infrastructures (European 
Commission, 2011b). 
The ‘Shift’ actions need sustainable transport planning. Hernández González and Corral 
Quintana (2016) applied a participatory multi-criteria assessment to five alternative 
sustainable transport policy proposals. According to their results, a transport system based 
on: (1) bus infrastructure and bus service expansion; (2) a moratorium on road 
infrastructure growth; and (3) the establishment of discouraging measures for private 
transport were suggested to boost the sustainability of the local transport system by 2020. 
These results have been proven to be robust by means of (social) sensitivity analysis 
(Corral and Hernandez, 2017). 
Lastly, ‘Improve’ refers to the application of new technologies and fuels to the transport 
system, especially to private transport, due to car use cannot be fully substituted by public 
transport systems in the Canary Islands (Calero, 2016). Thus, electric vehicles become a 
new way forward when neither non-motorised transport nor public transport are an 
efficient alternative option (EEA, 2016d). As seen in Figure 19, also pointed out in Colmenar 
et al. (2017), the sustainability of electric vehicles should be in line with the sustainability 
of the energy system (see section 5.3.4.1). 
According to Gils and Simon (2017) the combination of a modal shift towards buses, the 
shift to propulsion technologies and efficiency gains in engines might lead to a reduction 
of road transport energy demand by around 60 % in 2040. Most fuels may rely on 
electricity, followed by fossil fuel, hydrogen and biofuels (the latter as well as fossil fuels 
would be on their way to disappear from the transport energy mix). Fuel cell cars will 
become relevant around 2030, especially for heavy-duty vehicles. 
5.3.5.2 Air quality 
As seen in section 5.1.4.2, Saharan dust events are a natural cause of air pollution in the 
Canary Islands. It is known that winter dust season events have increased by a factor of 2 
since 1980. Meanwhile, summer dust events are related to an inversion layer at low 
altitudes that leads to air pollution episodes as a consequence of local industrial and 
transport emissions. Both, Saharan dust events and industrial and transport pollutant 
concentrations are known to produce negative effects on population health. Even though 
the effects of climate change on the evolution of Saharan dust outbreaks are under 
discussion (Alonso-Pérez et al., 2007), ageing population may involve a larger exposure to 
this climatic hazard. 
However, this scenario may involve a remarkable reduction of air pollution due to energy 
and transport renewable energies deployment. As seen in section 5.3.4.1, Tenerife and the 
Canary Islands may rely fully on renewable energies. Besides, as seen in section 5.3.5.1, 
land-based transport could also become more sustainable due to energy use reduction, an 
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increasing reliance on non-motorised and bus transport, as well as the introduction of green 
technologies and electricity to the private transport system. 
Figure 19. Life-cycle CO2 emissions for different vehicle and fuel types 
 
Source: Verbeek et al., 2015 (taken from EEA, 2016d). 
 
5.3.5.3 Water governance 
As seen in the ‘business as usual’ scenario, water resources are currently in a situation of 
depletion (Aguilera et al., 2000; Custodio et al., 2016) that have led to sea and brackish 
water desalination infrastructure expansion (see Figure 15). Therefore, the situation is not 
easy to curb. However, several measures are assumed to be carried out within this 
scenario. They consist of a sustainable demand-lead approach for water resources 
management, intended to adapt to climate change and reduce energy consumption from 
the water sector (EEA, 2009b). This approach is aimed at avoiding that water use exceeds 
ecosystem biophysical limits in the future (EEA, 2012). 
According to the European Commission and the European Environment Agency, actions 
can take place in different areas in order to improve water quantity and quality (European 
Commission, 2013b; EEA, 2009b, 2012). They are assumed for this scenario. The first 
action concerns water accounts. Thus, knowing how much water is available is essential in 
order to distribute the resources sustainably, whereas leaving enough quantity to nature. 
Secondly, water efficient targets and water stress indicators are monitored for all water 
users (agriculture, industry, and households). Third, water pricing is applied in order to 
reflect the full costs and water resource depletion, which means the establishment of clear 
links between price and volume of water consumed. Four, water leakage (including illegal 
water abstraction and use) is reduced as much as economically feasible. 
According to Aguilera et al. (2001) and Custodio et al. (2016), a certain number of specific 
actions can also be carried out within this scenario: (1) public water regulation and control 
of groundwater conditions as well as private sector activities in order to have (2) a 
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sustainable use of water resources, based on water use restrictions and water consumption 
reductions aimed at helping the aquifer to be recovered in the long term; (3) a 
redistribution of rights over water access and use, deciding which water uses are to be 
provided; and (4) better water governance based on stakeholders, experts and citizen 
involvement in water planning (EEA, 2014; see also section 5.3.3.1) as well as the 
establishment of an independent institution in charge of water resources. 
Regarding the supply-side, wind driven seawater desalination is assumed as a latent option 
to reduce the environmental impacts of desalination at reasonable costs (Romero et al., 
2005). This is linked to renewable energies deployment, explained in section 5.3.4.1. 
Figure 20 presents how the awakening scenario unfolds. 
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Figure 20. Unfolding the ‘awakening’ scenario 
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5.4 Collaborative communities 
The main idea behind this scenario is the development of a ‘collaborative economy’ based 
on ‘alternative consumption’ approaches. This change is initially led by a small part of an 
active local society that perceives the vulnerabilities of the ‘business as usual’ scenario, 
and does not believe in Governmental-led changes anymore, due to «it is unrealistic to 
expect the policy and political leaders to lead that social change» (Brown and Vergragt, 
2016, p. 314). This ‘collaborative economy’ is not however seen as new opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and economic growth (European Commission, 2016b), but as a transition 
towards sustainability and resilient societies (Martin, 2016). 
5.4.1 Economy 
5.4.1.1 Food production dependency 
The superstructure conceived for the ‘business as usual’ scenario remains. That is, 
conventional agricultural land continues to shrink, whereas local food demand increases as 
a consequence of both population growth and increasing tourist arrivals. Governmental 
policies remain the same for the agricultural sector, i.e. subsidies are allocated to export 
crops as well as imported food commodities. 
However, a minor part of the local society refuses to assume this panorama and begin to 
establish alternative networks toward agro-ecological farming. An interesting example is 
the one undertaken in Belgium (Bloemmen et al., 2015), called Community Supported 
Agriculture, which is based on organic vegetables production in a peri-urban context, where 
farmers sell their products directly to a community of consumers. Each member of the 
community is allocated the same share of production and then a fair price has to be paid 
for a box of products. Other examples at national level can be found in Spain, such as the 
Transition Network (http://www.reddetransicion.org/). 
In Tenerife there are interesting examples implementing collaborative-based initiatives, 
such as the one undertaken in ‘Finca El Mato Tinto’ in Tacoronte (Sánchez García, 2017). 
It is a non-profit organisation aimed at: (1) disseminating the principles of permaculture; 
(2) promoting job creation for people with special needs (e.g. with mental illnesses); (3) 
promoting crop production of native plant varieties and livestock, while conserving and 
disseminating the natural heritage of the island; and (4) promoting the participation of 
social engagement in permaculture. 
Other example is the so-called ‘Ecotribu Con + Conciencia’ in La Laguna 
(http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article30565.html). It is an alternative consumption 
initiative at local level where users and producers come together twice a month to 
exchange vegetables for a fair price that guarantee farmers a fixed income over the year. 
Decisions affecting the group are made democratically between all members during 
assemblies. The group also promotes awareness-raising campaigns within schools and 
other educational institutions. 
Other alternative agro-ecological farming initiatives can be found in Tenerife. For example, 
in Arico there is the so-called ‘Proyecto San Borondon’ 
(http://www.proyectosanborondon.es/) and in Puerto de la Cruz the one called ‘Grupo de 
Consumo Espacio Asamblea’ (http://espacioasamblea.com/). Both following the same 
paradigm than ‘Finca El Mato Tinto’ and ‘Ecotribu Con + Conciencia’. All these groups are 
integrated in the project LASOS (http://www.proyectolasos.com/), an acronym for Agro-
ecological Sustainability Laboratory, which is a pilot project for the integration of economic, 
environmental and social dimensions for a more autonomous island. 
5.4.1.2 Tourism sector 
The evolution of this sector remains the same to the one presented in the ‘business as 
usual’ scenario, i.e. sun-and-sand resorts rule the tourism sector. The economic situation 
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of this sector improves in the coming years in terms of number of arrivals. This sector 
continues delivering ancillary benefits on the rest of the economic sectors, accumulating 
around 40 % of total employment. 
As seen in the ‘business as usual’ scenario, this model of mass tourism remains 
unsustainable, especially damaging the coastal landscapes. The increasing arrival of 
tourists induces the construction of new infrastructures, such as roads, ports, etc., leading 
to additional environmental impacts. 
Minor alternative activities may take place among the most aware population. A local 
example of this alternative way of doing tourism is the Association ‘Desaplatánate’ 
(http://desaplatanate.org/es/frontpage/). It is a non-profit organisation aimed at 
promoting the development of an alternative, social and sustainable tourism model that 
improves the living conditions of the local population, guaranteeing the respect for the local 
nature and the cultural values of local communities. 
5.4.2 Society 
5.4.2.1 Poverty and inequality 
As for the ‘business as usual’ scenario, big changes are not assumed to occur for this 
scenario. Employment may grow along with the economic activity, but poverty (including 
in-work poverty) continues to rise, since the economic model remains relying on low labour 
productivity and low salaries. Whereas computerisation may also put at risk low-wage jobs. 
It is also assumed that, as for the ‘business as usual’ scenario, 1/3 of the population 
become socially excluded. However, the explosion of ‘collaborative community’ networks 
might provide opportunities for those who felt apart providing certain levels of dignity. 
Now, Community based networks exerts as a ‘parallel State’ that might reduce poverty 
and vulnerability of those excluded from the mainstream society. One of the most 
interesting examples is the one carried out by the agroecological farm ‘Ecotribu 
Con + Conciencia’ (http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article30565.html). This group, 
since its inception, facilitated that people who had lost their jobs during the financial crisis 
as well as people who had consumed all their unemployment benefits were able to harvest 
abandoned agricultural land to provide a group of consumers with biofood production 
(vegetables and fruit especially) in exchange of a fair and stable price along the year. The 
farmers have therefore guaranteed an income for the years to come, whereas consumers 
have the option of buying high quality products at fair prices. This network has grown to 
the extent that those previously unemployed (today’s farmers) cannot attend the current 
demand. A waiting list had to be created as a response (4). 
5.4.2.2 Social values and lifestyle 
The social values assumed for this scenario are aligned with a new framing of wellbeing, 
consisting of a shift from consumerist lifestyles to stronger sense of community (Brown 
and Vergragt, 2016). Furthermore, social innovation (understood as meeting social needs 
more effectively by means of social actors’ participation) becomes more relevant (Mont et 
al., 2014). This social innovation processes are also seen as a positive contribution to local 
sustainability, due to social values rely on collaboration, local economies, and self-
sufficiency (Sekulova et al., 2013). 
Now, leisure time is seen as a way to communicate with others, as well as an opportunity 
to encourage self-development, contribute to the community and professional networks 
(Mont et al., 2014). Moreover, people are perceived as the engine that transforms the 
world instead of politicians. However, these values are assume to work very slowly due to 
these values move against the current dominant imaginary (Romano, 2012), as seen in 
the ‘business as usual’ scenario. 
                                           
(4) Personal communication. 
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5.4.3 Governance 
5.4.3.1 Politics and decision-making 
As for the ‘business as usual’ scenario, local economic powers and private interests might 
colligate with mainstreaming political parties to maintain the statu quo. Thus, 
mainstreaming governance would continue implementing policies that might increase the 
vulnerability of the island. 
Politicians show a lack of interest in resilience and sustainability. The backbone of policies 
is based on the expansion of infrastructure, whereas public participation in decision-making 
remains the same as presented in the ‘business as usual’ scenario. Political and corporate 
corruption may endure at the same pace infrastructure expands. 
5.4.4 Energy and technology 
5.4.4.1 Energy and green technologies 
As seen in the previous scenarios, fossil fuel supply capacity will decline at global scale, 
inducing an increase in oil and gas prices during the next two decades. Even though 
renewable energy prices will become attractive, a low renewable energy investment is 
assumed, as for the ‘business as usual’ scenario; therefore, energy planning for the Canary 
Islands will continue to be ignored due to poor environmental governance. The expected 
consequences are increasing energy bills, air pollution problems (partially compensated by 
car electrification), and a continuation of external energy dependency. 
However, these facts encourage social innovation and social movements to support 
‘collaborative energy networks’. An increasing amount of conscious people get involved in 
groups of producers/consumers of green energy. Thus, both consumers and producers are 
the same agents within those groups. 
A group like this already exists in Tenerife, called ‘Som Energia’ 
(https://www.somenergia.coop/es/quienes-somos/#quehacemos). It is a cooperative of 
consumers producing and distributing 100 % renewable energies by means of the existing 
network. The cooperative’s capital is funded by their members and the energy produced is 
consumed by the same members. Other existing movements are the so-called ‘Proponents 
for a new energy model for the Canary Islands’ 
(http://www.nuevomodeloenergetico.org/pgs2/index.php/news/nace-la-plataforma-por-
un-nuevo-modelo-energetico-para-canarias-px1nmec/), which gives support to a new 
energy culture in the Islands, based on the concept of energy sovereignty and renewable 
energy development. 
5.4.5 Environment 
5.4.5.1 Land-based transport planning 
In general, the mainstreaming land-based transport trends are not expected to become 
sustainable, the same as for the ‘business as usual’ scenario. Again, both the Government 
of the Canary Islands and the Island Council are committed to expand road transport and 
passenger cars, whereas railway infrastructures might also be introduced at high 
opportunity costs (Calero, 2016). Urban sprawl continues and the island will continue 
working as a big sprawling city encouraging private cars. 
Notwithstanding, social innovation may bring forward alternative modes of transport that 
might reduce the unsustainable levels of land-based transport. Some initiatives can be 
mentioned, such as the car-sharing example of BlaBlaCar 
(https://www.blablacar.es/coche-compartido/santa-cruz-de-tenerife/), intended to bring 
together private transport supply (in terms of passenger-km) and transport demand at a 
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given social cooperative price. Thus, road congestion may be reduced as well as air 
pollutant emissions. 
An increase in bicycle use, as the mode of transport most often used, might also be 
assumed for this scenario, especially for those people conscious of resilience, such as the 
groups ‘Tenerife por la Bici’ (http://tenerifeporlabici.blogspot.it/). In fact, there is a huge 
margin of improvement in this matter due to only 3 % of commuters in Spain use the 
bicycle every day as a main mode of transport, compared to the 36 % in the Netherlands, 
23 % in Denmark, or 22 % in Hungary (European Commission, 2014a). 
5.4.5.2 Air quality 
As seen in the previous scenarios, Saharan dust events are a natural cause of air pollution 
in the Canary Islands. However, as indicated, the relation between climate change and 
Saharan dust outbreaks is still under discussion, highlighting the uncertainties involved in 
the evolution of this climatic event. What is almost certain is the expected larger exposure 
to this climatic event due to population growth and ageing. 
Again, as for the ‘business as usual’ scenario, air quality might be improved partially by 
means of car electrification. However, the energy system will continue relying on fossil fuel 
sources. 
5.4.5.3 Water governance 
As for the ‘business as usual’ scenario, water resources may continue unsustainably 
managed since the current water demand exceeds the available natural water resources, 
especially as a consequence of groundwater depletion. The quantity of losses produced 
within the network may continue in the long term. Again, this situation requires 
desalination technologies so as to provide the exceeding demand with freshwater. Even 
though desalination technologies are expected to become more efficient in terms of energy 
use, the expected fossil fuel dependency may lead to remarkably conventional fuel 
dependency for water production. Furthermore, water production remains concentrated in 
powerful stakeholders, whereas the dependence on desalination is assumed to worsen in 
the long term. 
This panorama may encourage social innovation and alternative movements to explore the 
potentials of fog-collection catchment, especially by collaborative agricultural communities. 
There is capacity to collect at least 170 m3 of water from clouds in the Teno Rural Park in 
Tenerife (Marzol Jaén, 2002), as well as 880 litres of water per m2 in the Anaga Rural Park 
(Marzol, 2008). Fog-collection techniques may be further explored by alternative 
‘collaborative economy’ supporters, so as to increase water sovereignty within those 
alternative groups. 
In Figure 21 the scenario is unfold. In this case the scheme does not reflect how the whole 
system may work in the future; instead, it shows how collaborative communities might 
interact between them to collaborate and help each other towards the pathway of building 
resilience. 
 
 
  
59 
Figure 21. Unfolding the collaborative communities scenario 
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6 A descriptive comparison 
In Table 13 a qualitative comparison of the scenarios is presented. The horizontal axis 
present the scenarios, whereas the vertical axes show the outcome of each scenario 
analysed. 
 
Table 13. A descriptive comparison of scenarios’ outcomes 
Scenario 
performance 
Business as usual Awakening Collaborative 
communities 
Energy 
management 
The energy system remains 
environmentally unsustainable, 
depending on fossil fuels. Gas 
may substitute oil as the main 
source of energy. 
The energy grid, as well as the 
land-based transport system, 
become energetically sustainable. 
PV and wind energy become the 
main source of energy. 
The energy system remains 
environmentally unsustainable within 
the mainstreaming economy. However, 
collaborative communities become 
producers of green energy to satisfy 
their own demand. 
Energy 
sovereignty 
Depends on fossil fuels (oil and 
gas) and, therefore, from external 
supplies. The energy bill increases 
sharply within the coming decades 
due to increasing fossil fuel prices. 
A fossil fuel-free economy is 
reached. Both electricity supply 
and the land-based transport 
system become 100 % 
renewable. The island becomes 
energetically independent, and 
the energy bill drops remarkably.  
The mainstreaming economy depends 
on fossil fuels (oil and gas) and, 
therefore, from external supplies. The 
energy bill increases sharply in the 
coming decades. Collaborative 
renewable energy groups growth 
steadily. 
Water 
management 
Water resources are 
unsustainably managed. 
Groundwater is depleted and 
increasing water demand is 
satisfied by supply-side solutions, 
such as desalination (powered by 
fossil fuels). 
Unsustainable water management 
is publicly recognised and 
demand-side schemes are 
adopted based on efficient water-
pricing. Desalination continues, 
but relies on renewable energy 
sources. Groundwater may 
recover in the long term. 
Water resources are unsustainably 
managed by the mainstreaming 
economy. Increasing water demand is 
satisfied by desalination (powered by 
fossil fuels). However, alternative 
collaborative communities begin to 
explore fog-water collection for 
irrigation. 
Food self-
sufficiency 
Food production dependency 
grows as a consequence of both 
increasing local and tourist 
demand and reduced local supply. 
Food production dependency is 
reduced due to increased local 
food production. This initiative is 
encouraged by local governments. 
Food production dependency remains 
high. However, community supported 
agriculture expands steadily and 
becomes partially relevant in the island. 
Energy and water needs may be 
satisfied by other collaborative 
networks. 
Tourism 
sustainability 
Relies on sun-and-sand resorts. 
Quantity is considered more 
important than quality. 
Relies on sun-and-sand resorts. 
However, new trends push for a 
more ecotourism-based sector. 
Quality may become more 
important than quantity. 
Relies on sun-and-sand resorts. Minor 
groups try to provide sustainable 
alternative options for local and foreign 
tourism without much success. 
Mainstreaming tourism lingers on. 
Poverty/inequality Remain or get worse, since the 
roots of poverty are linked to the 
economic model. This model is 
based on low-productivity jobs. 
Computerisation may produce 
more unemployment. 
Drops since the economic model 
relies on research, innovation and 
greener technologies. High-skilled 
workers and well-rewarded jobs 
are required, avoiding partially 
the consequences of 
computerisation. 
Remain or might improve slightly. Even 
though the mainstreaming economic 
model persists, the collaborative 
economy may exert as a parallel 
welfare State within their alternative 
community groups. 
Environmental 
quality 
Emissions from the electricity grid 
increase, whereas land-based 
transport emissions might be 
reduced due to electrification and 
new fuels. However, a car-centred 
transport system may induce 
additional environmental impacts. 
Emissions from the electricity grid 
and the land-based transport 
system are reduced to zero. The 
land-based transport system 
relies on non-motorised transport, 
as well as public transport 
systems. More efficient and 
environmental-friendly 
technologies will also improve 
environmental quality. 
Emissions from the electricity grid 
increase, whereas land-based transport 
emissions might be reduced due to 
electrification and new fuels. However, 
a car-centred transport system may 
induce additional environmental 
impacts. Collaborative groups may 
improve slightly the environmental 
quality due to their sustainable 
activities. 
Human health Climate risks rise due to 
increasing hazards (more 
frequent and intense heatwaves), 
increasing exposure (population 
growth) and increasing 
vulnerability (ageing and 
poverty). Air pollution might 
improve due to car electrification. 
Climate risks might rise due to 
increasing hazards (more 
frequent and intense heatwaves) 
and exposure (population 
growth). Vulnerability increases 
due to ageing but it is also 
reduced due to poverty 
alleviation. Air quality improves 
remarkably. 
Climate risk rise due to increasing 
hazards (more frequent and intense 
heatwaves), increasing exposure 
(population growth) and increasing 
vulnerability (ageing and poverty). Air 
pollution might improve slightly due to 
car electrification, car-sharing and an 
increasing cycling movements. 
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In Table 14 a qualitative visual comparison of the scenarios is presented. Green arrows 
indicate improvement, orange arrows indicate continuity, and red arrows show a decline. 
Fig. 22 also presents a visual comparison of the scenarios. 
 
Table 14. A qualitative comparison of scenarios’ outcomes 
Scenario performance 
Vulnerability 
Business as usual Awakening Collaborative 
economy 
Human health    
Poverty/inequality    
Tourism sustainability    
Energy self-sufficiency     
Energy sustainability    
Food self-sufficiency    
Water use sustainability    
Environmental quality    
 
Figure 22. A visual comparison of the scenarios 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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7 Conclusions 
Scenario building may be described as a puzzle composed of existing-disperse information 
regarding a certain issue that need to be brought together in a single piece so that future 
pathways of a given problematique can be explored. In this case study, the concept of 
resilience has been analysed in a small European island (Tenerife, Canary Islands). To the 
authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to narrate possible future scenarios of 
socioeconomic resilience for a small island. 
Due to scenario building should be intensively participatory such that the outcomes may 
be successful and worthwhile (Raskin et al., 1998; Schwartz, 1991), a participatory 
approach has been applied in this case study in order to explore future pathways along 
with the extended communities of Tenerife island. Key social actors on climate resilience 
and citizens were engaged in the process since its inception. A range of social techniques 
were applied, such as in-depth interviews, questionnaires, and focus groups, in order to 
identify future pathways as well as the components of scenario building, e.g. critical 
dimensions, driving forces, strategic invariants and critical uncertainties. 
Three future 2040 scenarios were described. A first scenario explored the future of Tenerife 
under a continuation of current policies and socioeconomic forces. Thus, the external 
dependency of food, energy, and water (since the latter depends on desalination by means 
of fossil fuels) produce a low resilience to hypothetical external shocks. An economic model 
based on sun-and-sand tourism and the construction sector is the base for vulnerability to 
computerisation (since low skill jobs are more vulnerable to robotisation), potentially 
leading to unemployment and larger poverty rates, reducing the resilience of local 
communities, especially to climatic events. 
The second scenario images Tenerife under sharp changes in social values. Social values 
are aligned with the concepts of resilience and sustainability. Therefore, these changes are 
translated into politics and policy-making. The island becomes 100 % fossil-fuel free, and 
local agricultural production increases to the extent that a larger amount of local food 
demand can be satisfied with local products. Water desalination can now be satisfied with 
renewable energies. The need for research and development to give support to the fossil-
free economy works as a catapult towards a transition to an economic model that demands 
high-skilled workers, much less susceptible to computerisation. 
The third scenario narrates how the future of Tenerife could be if a business as usual 
scenario continues, but a certain part of the local society decides to explore resilient 
initiatives without Governmental support. This might be the case of collaborative 
communities encouraged by small groups of residents who become organised in 
cooperatives of consumption, producing their own bio-agricultural, green energy and water 
needs. These initiatives might provide with certain coverage and protection to those who 
felt apart in the mainstream society. 
One of the findings of this research, points out the uncertainties involving the sustainability 
of the tourism sector. It is known that a mass tourism economy based on sun-and-sand 
resorts have associated negative impacts on the local environment, especially in coastal 
areas. It is also known that there is neither alternative fuels for aviation nor expected 
revolutionary technologies; therefore, sustainable transport in the tourism sector is still a 
utopia. 
The second key finding highlights the identification of the concept ‘resilience’ as the 
reinforcement of the nexus between water-energy-food sovereignty. Understanding how 
these three sectors may become as much self-sufficient as possible, as well as how they 
may interact sustainably has been identified as a potential research area that might give 
room to a change in the local economic model so that a high-skilled job economy can be 
achieved. As seen, these jobs and areas of knowledge are much less vulnerable to 
computerisation, since these jobs rely on human innovative ideas, a skill that cannot be 
substituted by algorithms (Frey and Osborne, 2017). 
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